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Abstract: The essay reviews major environmental problems of energy 
development within a broader development and sustainability context. The role 
of energy in human development and major historical trends as well as their 
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review s available mitigation and adaptation options including: energy 
efficiency improvements, fuels switching, zero-carbon energy options, 
emission abatement and disposal at large point sources, enhancement of natural 
s inks, and adaptation measures. Specific circumstances of developing Fers11s 
industrialized countries are outlined. The essay concludes with a review of 
policy in struments that could reconcile protection of the atmosphere with 
human development and sustainability objectives. 
Keywords: Energy; carbon dioxide; climate change; historical trends; 
mitigation options; policy inst ruments. 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Nakicenovic, N . and 
GrUbler, A. (2000) ' Energy and the protection of the atmosphere', Int. J. 
Global Energy lsrnes, Vol. 13, Nos. 1-3, pp.4-57. 
Biographical notes: Nebojsa Nakicenovic is Project Leader of the 
Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies Project at the International 
In stitute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria. He also 
se rves as Convening Lead and Lead Author for the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and as guest professor at the Technical University of 
Graz. Prof. Nakicenovic holds bachelor's and master's degrees in economics 
and computer science from Princeton University, New Jersey, USA and the 
University of Vienna, where he also completed his Ph.D. 
Arnulf GrUbler is a research scholar at llASA, Laxenburg, Austria and Lead 
Author for the IPCC. He holds masters and PhDs degrees from the Technical 
University in Vienna, Austria and is lecturer at the Mining University, Leoben, 
Austria. He is editorial board member of Tec/111ological Forecasting & Social 
Change and Jo11mal of Industrial Ecology. His recent publications include 
Technology and Global Change, published by Cambridge University Press. 
1 Introduction 
The earth's atmosphere is affected by many interrelated anthropogenic sources of 
interference that can lead to environmental impacts and ultimately to irreversible changes 
in the climate system. Human interferences include local and regional air pollution and 
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, aerosols and halocarbons. Combustion of 
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fossil fuels and unsustainable uses of biomass fuels cause extensive local and regional 
(transboundary) air pollution often resulting in acidification that damages entire 
ecosystems. The extraction, conversion and combustion of fossil fuels, and to a lesser 
degree land-use changes and agriculture, lead to increasing concentrations of greenhouse 
gases that are altering the radiative balance of the atmosphere, possibly causing climate 
change. Human activities have increased the atmospheric concentration of many naturally 
occurring gases and have also added new ones. Anthropogenic sources of 
chlorofluorocarbons are adding to the greenhouse effect and are gradually destroying the 
ozone layer. Taken together, these human activities are projected to change regional and 
global climate. These changes will affect large populations and especially those 
communities that are most vulnerable, particularly the poor who have lower abilities and 
resources to adapt to changing climatic conditions. 
Protection of the atmosphere is one of the important preconditions for ensuring that 
economic development can proceed in a sustainable manner. This essay addresses issues 
related to the protection of the atmosphere from energy-related pollution sources . It 
analyses the relationship between energy and development, prevailing trends in energy 
use throughout the world and possible future developments. Possible impacts on the 
atmosphere, and strategies for mitigating and avoiding adverse impacts of possible 
climate change are discussed. The report concludes with an assessment of the available 
policy measures for the protection of the atmosphere within the context of sustainable 
human development. 
1.1 Local and transboundary air pollution 
Local and transboundary pollutants from energy-related activities cause the deterioration 
of air quality in many urban and some rural regions throughout the world [1,2]. Various 
forms of pollution often result in respiratory diseases and other health impacts and 
hazards. They also result in economic damage and endanger ecosystems. 
High levels of indoor air pollution from burning low quality biomass or coal in 
traditional open fireplaces are widespread in developing countries [3]. This is harming 
the health of women and children in particular. Sulphur and particulate concentrations 
that are associated largely with coal combustion far exceed the World Health 
Organization standards in numerous large urban agglomerations, especially in developing 
countries [2]. 
Sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions from fossil power plants and dense 
motorized traffic cause regional and transboundary air pollution that leads to acidification 
of forests, lakes and soils. 'Acid rain' has been a particular problem in Europe and North 
America. More recently, transboundary air pollution and increasing acidification have 
also become sources of concern in the rapidly developing, coal-intensive economies of 
East Asia [4]. 
1.2 Increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases 
Concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased significantly since the beginning of 
the fossil fuel era two centuries ago. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have 
increased by 30% (Figure I), those of methane by 150% and those of nitrous oxides by 
over 10%. Scientific evidence is strong that most of these increases are due to human 
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activities such as the burning of fossil fuels, land-use changes and agriculture. It will take 
many decades to centuries before additional atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases related to human activities are absorbed by natural sinks. Increasing concentrations 
of greenhouse gases tend to warm the atmosphere, whereas aerosols such as sulphur 
dioxide tend to cool it in some regions . 
Figure 1 Changes in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration as measured at Mauna Loa 
Observatory, Hawaii (in parts per million by volume, ppmv) 
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These increases in the atmospheric greenhouse gases and aerosols, taken together, are 
expected to lead to higher mean global temperatures and are projected to change regional 
and global climates including inter alia precipitation, soil moisture, air and ocean 
currents and sea levels [6] . Climate change, in turn, could lead to adverse environmental 
impacts affecting human activities and endangering sustainable development. The exact 
nature of these impacts, including their extent, variability and regional patterns, are 
subject to considerable scientific uncertainty. The climate system is by its nature difficult 
to predict. Therefore, future climate changes may also involve 'surprises ' [6]. Many 
ecosystems, some agricultural activities, and low-lying coastal areas are particularly 
vulnerable to projected climate change even in the absence of surprises. Poor populations 
are highly vulnerable, primarily because they lack sufficient resources to protect 
themselves from adverse impacts, such as extreme weather conditions and to adapt to 
climate changes. 
The depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer is largely caused by emissions of 
chlorofluorocarbons and halons. This results in increased ultraviolet radiation reaching 
the earth's surface that can impact on human health, including increased cases of skin 
cancer and eye disease. The chlorofluorocarbons also produce a greenhouse effect: 
however, this is offset somewhat by decreases in ozone which is also a greenhouse gas. A 
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reduction of the ozone depleting substances is regulated by the Montreal Protocol [7], but 
some of the replacements for ozone depleting substances are, in turn, potent greenhouse 
gases. 
1.3 Energy for development and climate change 
Energy production and use is the main source of many of the threats to the earth's 
atmosphere. Despite tremendous increases in commercial energy use to date, the majority 
of the global population still has inadequate access to the kind of energy services enjoyed 
by the inhabitants of the industrialized countries. More than two billion people have no 
access to modern energy services whatsoever [8]. A lack of adequate energy services is 
one of the unfortunate symptoms of poverty. The inequalities are so great that it would be 
virtually impossible for the majority of the world's population to enjoy similar resource 
intensive energy-use patterns as those prevailing in industrialized countries. The 
assimilative capacity of the biosphere to absorb gigantic releases of pollutants would be 
far exceeded; although science is at present not in a position to suggest particular 
threshold levels or exact boundary conditions for future energy development. 
More sustainable energy patterns throughout the world and the protection of the 
atmosphere are therefore recognized as important policy objectives at both national and 
international levels [I]. International environmental agreements are being extended from 
the local and national to international levels . Examples include the European Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution [9] and its 1995 Second Sulphur Protocol, 
the Montreal Protocol [7] for the reduction of chlorofluorocarbon emissions, and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) whose ultimate 
ohjective is the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" 
[ 10]. 
Adequate protection of the earth's atmosphere to prevent 'dangerous' interference 
involves a number of formidable challenges. Considerable energy increases are required 
to satisfy basic human needs and to further social and economic development. However, 
the current, largely inadequate, use of energy in many instances already produces 
emissions that exceed tolerable levels in urban regions and that exceed critical loads for 
many ecosystems in rural regions. Remedies are needed urgently, but the current 
dependence on fossil fuels for the provision of energy services will persist for many 
decades to come. Again, the adverse impacts of energy use are going to increase without 
appropriate and timely countermeasures. Restructuring towards more sustainable energy-
use patterns would require large research and development (R&D) efforts and determined 
policy measures . It is very capital intensive, requiring new forms of financing and many 
decades of capital turnover. 
Protection of the atmosphere at the local, regional and global levels faces a number of 
competing social and economic policy concerns. Some of them have higher priorities 
such as the eradication of poverty, provision of adequate health care and employment 
opportunities and a number of other basic human needs. The challenge of protecting the 
atmosphere is further compounded by persistent scientific uncertainties concerning the 
exact nature of the interaction between human activities and the atmosphere and about 
the possible impacts of climate change, including the costs and benefits of adaptation and 
mitigation. 
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The FCCC provides guidance for policies directed at protecting the atmosphere 
despite scientific uncertainties. This includes taking 'precautionary measures' especially 
where there are threats of 'serious irreversible damage'. The FCCC also states that the 
'lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures', 
that measures should be globally cost-effective, comprehensive and that they should take 
into account different socio-economic contexts [10]. 
2 Energy for development 
Energy needs are driven by three principal factors: population growth, economic and 
industrial development and technological change. Energy can be seen as one of the 
fundamental requirements for economic growth and social improvements and not just a 
consequence of such growth. This section assesses the role of energy in economic 
development, energy-related environmental impacts as a function of the level of 
economic development and some salient preconditions for sustainable energy 
development. 
2.1 The role of energy in economic development 
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the energy system relied on harnessing natural energy 
flows and animate and human power to provide the required energy services, in the form 
of heat, light and work. Power densities and availability were constrained by site-specific 
factors. Mechanical energy sources were limited to draught animals, water and windmills. 
Burning of fuel-wood and tallow candles were the only means of converting chemical 
energy to heat and light. Energy consumption typically did not exceed 0.5 toe (tons of oil 
equivalent) per capita per year [ 11 ]. 
Today, some two billion people still rely on similar traditional energy end-use 
patterns. They use traditional energy forms and technologies and have no or inadequate 
access to modern energy services. This severely constrains the satisfaction of basic needs: 
it precludes the modernization of economic structures and hinders human development. 
Figures 2.1 shows the 1990 per capita energy consumption in a number of world 
regions by source and contrasts this with their respective populations. The height of the 
bars in Figure 2.1 is proportional to current capita energy use, the width of the bars is 
proportional to population size. Hence, the area of each bar is proportional to total energy 
use. The differences in the per capita primary energy consumption in the world are 
indeed very large. Less than a third of the world's population consume more than two-
thirds of global energy. Cumulative historical consumption is even more unevenly 
distributed: about 85% of all energy used to date has been consumed by less than 20% of 
all the people who have lived since 1850. 
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Figure 2.1 Primary energy use in 1990 (in toe) by source, compared to population (in millions), 
for different world regions 
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Current per capita commercial energy consumption varies by a factor of more than 20 
between North America and South Asia. For example, total primary energy use is about 
0.4 toe per capita in Bangladesh. This is ten times lower than per capita use in Western 
Europe and the Pacific OECD and about 20 times lower than in North America. These 
disparities are even higher in the use of modem, commercial energy forms, i.e., excluding 
the consumption of traditional, non-commercial energy such as biomass. For example, 
commercial energy use is only 0.1 toe per capita in Bangladesh. This is nearly 100 times 
smaller than Canada with 9.4 toe per capita. Commercial energy use per capita can differ 
by as much as 500 between individual countries in the most extreme cases. 
Western Europe and Japan have much lower per capita energy consumption when 
compared to North America with about the same levels of affluence. This indicates a 
substantial degree of diversity in energy consumption patterns even among industrialized 
countries. Disparities are also large among developing countries and they are even larger 
across different social and economic groups everywhere. 
Another important difference is in the structure of energy supply. Developing 
countries rely primarily on coal and other solid fuels such as traditional and non-
commercial biomass [13]. Most of the industrialized countries draw on large shares of 
crude oil and natural gas in their primary energy consumption; some regions have 
substantial contributions of nuclear energy and modem renewable sources. 
There is a visible and statistically significant relationship between per capita energy 
consumption and per capita economic output across individual countries and regions and 
over time, despite the large differences in current and historical patterns of energy use. 
This relationship is shown in Figure 2.2. Economic output is measured in terms of Gross 
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Domestic Product (GDP) both at prevailing market exchange rates (mer) and at 
purchasing power parities (ppp). The relationship holds for both measures. The main 
difference is that the purchasing power of consumers in developing regions and in 
economies in transition is higher than if measured in terms of international market 
exchange rates. 
Figure 2.2 Primary energy (toe) per capita versus GDP per capita (US( 1990)$ at market 
exchange rates, GDP mec• and purchasing power parities, GDP PPP) for selected world 
regions and two historical trajectories for the USA (1800-1990) and Japan 
(1900-1990). 
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At one extreme are the countries with lowest income and also lowest per capita energy 
use. They include Subsaharan Africa (AFR) and South Asia (SAS). As incomes rise so 
does energy use. At intermediate levels of per capita economic output and energy use are 
the economies of North Africa and the Middle East (MEA), Pacific Asia (PAS) and Latin 
America (LAM). Current per capita primary energy use in some of the higher income 
economies of Asia already exceeds that of some OECD economies. For example, Hong 
Kong, South Korea and Taiwan consume more energy per person than Turkey, Spain, 
Portugal or Greece. Per capita energy use in Singapore is about the same as in the United 
Kingdom [ 18]. 
Although this pattern of growing energy use with economic development is 
pervasive, there is no unique and universal 'law' that specifies an exact relationship 
between economic growth and energy use. This depends on many specific and individual 
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factors prevailing in a given country or region. It depends on historical development 
paths, natural resource endowments, settlement patterns, transport requirements, policy 
and tax structures and on many other geographic, climatic, economic, social and 
institutional factors . This also explains the persistent differences in energy-use patterns 
between countries and regions even at comparable levels of income. Different 
development pathways span all the extremes from 'high energy intensity' to 'high energy 
efficiency'. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2 with the development paths of the USA and 
Japan; they show no apparent signs of convergence. Per capita energy consumption is 
lower in Japan than in the USA; this was the case throughout the whole period of 
industrialization and at all levels of income. 
2.2 Environmental impacts of energy 
The type and extent of the environmental impacts of energy production and use are 
closely related to the degree of economic development and industrialization. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.3. Three different classes of environmental problems are 
distinguished in the figure following a World Bank [ 19] classification. They include 
environmental problems of poverty, industrialization and afjluence. Different phases of 
economic development place different burdens on the environment but economic 
development also enables societies to resolve environmental challenges. Different types 
of environmental problems call for different policy approaches and solutions. 
Figure 2.3 A typology of environmental problems and strategies as they evolve with economic 
development 
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Examples of environmental problems that result from poverty include inadequate 
sanitation, Jack of clean drinking water, high levels of indoor and outdoor particulate 
matter air pollution. Indoor air pollution is largely due to (inefficient) burning of fuel-
wood in traditional open fireplaces. High outdoor particulate air concentrations are 
largely due to biomass and coal combustion and, to a lesser degree, to motorized traffic . 
Impacts are usually limited to those areas close to the source of pollution. Adverse 
impacts often include poor human health, sometimes also resulting in high mortality 
especially when it occurs in combination with poverty. The main and most effective 
policy response to these types of environmental problems is economic development itself. 
The eradication of poverty and increasing incomes improve accessibility to modern 
energy services that decrease indoor and particulate pollution. Human health generally 
improves with economic development. 
The second category of environmental problems related to the process of 
industriali::,ation includes high ambient concentrations of sulphur dioxide and high levels 
of hazardous industrial wastes. Problems emerge primarily in urban and industrial areas, 
but with increasing levels of industrialization they also spread to larger regions and start 
affecting many ecosystems in addition to impacting on human health. These 
environmental impacts can range in duration from days, such as urban smog, to much 
longer time spans in cases of regional-scale pollution like acid rain, toxification of river 
basins, or deforestation of whole regions. 
The environmental problems associated with industrialization tend first to intensify 
and increase in magnitude and extent, they then reach a peak and thereafter decline. The 
increase during the initial phase of industrialization is due to the expansion of production 
and urbanization. The reasons for the decline are also related to economic development. 
Once basic economic needs are satisfied and income levels have increased, the amenities 
of a clean local environment become important social and economic objectives. 
Economic growth also provides the resources required to tackle environmental problems 
successfully. The policy measures required to resolve the environmental problems of 
industrialization need to combine incentives for a cleaner environment with regulatory 
mechanisms. Incentives need to further structural change toward more efficient use of 
energy and other resources including better energy end-use devices, cleaner fuels and 
improved public infrastructures, among others. Regulatory mechanisms inter alia include 
environmental standards, financial and tax incentives, control of large emissions point 
sources, and regular equipment maintenance and replacement. 
The last category of environmental problems associated with economic development 
according to the above classification is related to affluence. Typical examples include 
ever-increasing volumes of municipal wastes and energy-related emissions of greenhouse 
gases, most notably carbon dioxide (C02). The direct impacts on human health (toxicity) 
are generally low. Environmental impacts are mostly of an indirect long-term nature, 
extending over decades to centuries. Their extent and exact nature are often uncertain; 
sometimes it is not clear whether environmental impacts are even occurring or will ever 
occur. Examples include climate change and loss of biodiversity. Spatial scales extend 
from the regional to the global level. In contrast to the first two categories, the 
environmental problems of affluence tend to become exacerbated with rising levels of 
income and consumption, and evidence is still outstanding as to whether municipal waste 
or carbon dioxide emissions might saturate with rising affluence. Hence, policy strategies 
need to be comprehensive and cover numerous economic activities; they need to promote 
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long-term structural changes for production and consumption alike. There are generally 
no easy, quick 'technological fixes ' . 
Two important generic strategies to address environmental issues at high levels of 
income and consumption include improved energy efficiency and 'decarbonization' of 
energy, that is, changes towards cleaner fuel supply and end-use structures. Improved 
efficiency generally reduces resource use and environmental impacts across all pollutants 
and across all spatial and temporal scales. 'Decarbonization' also entails elements of 
multipurpose strategies as it can simultaneously reduce global, regional and local energy-
related pollution. In addition to efficiency improvements and cleaner energy, so-called 
'end-of-the-pipe' pollution abatement systems have been successfully applied to large 
point sources and more recently to some mobile sources. These include sulphur and 
nitrogen scrubbers for power plants and catalytic converters for motor vehicles. These 
systems have the advantage that they can be effected relatively quickly. However, they 
have a more limited effect in reducing emissions than other more generic options, such as 
structural change. They tend to reduce one pollutant in one particular location, rather than 
have the broader impact of a switch to cleaner fuels or to inherently emission-free energy 
systems. 
2.3 Energy and sustainable development 
The notion of sustainable development concerns both current and future generations. For 
current generations, the first and foremost precondition for sustainable development is the 
eradication of poverty and satisfaction of basic human needs. Once these needs are 
satisfied, the next objective of sustainable development is to provide the basis for human 
choices. These involve many dimensions including cultural, social and economic. As 
such they cannot be resolved by scientific methods but are, of course, a question of 
values, preferences and policies. The same applies for future generations, albeit the 
uncertainties are larger because the social, cultural and economic contexts for future 
generations is unknown. 
The necessary preconditions for sustainable development are: 
avoidance of catastrophic events threatening the life support functions of the earth, 
including irreversible changes, and 
2 provision of the means and capabilities for present and future generations to satisfy 
their basic needs and giving them the possibility of making choices about their lives 
beyond basic needs, including the capacity to adapt to changing social, economic and 
environmental conditions. 
This means the transference of increased knowledge and know-how, technology and 
capital from the present to future generations. These transfers are compensation for the 
use of resources by current and past generations. 
For sustainable energy development this implies making sufficient energy services 
available to every citizen of the planet now and in the future so that basic human needs 
can be satisfied. However, because the current energy system predominantly relies on 
fossil fuel use, this involves consuming resources. In order to compensate future 
generations for the consumption of depletable energy resources (coal, oil and gas) energy 
systems need to become more efficient, have a larger portfolio of technologies and 
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options to choose from and have drastically lower environmental impacts at all levels 
from local to global. 
Another prime energy objective in the context of sustainable development is to avoid 
irreversible changes while fulfilling the above goals. For example, things that must be 
avoided include: greenhouse gas emissions at levels that would provoke major disruptive 
changes in the climate system; sulphur emissions and deposition that surpass the critical 
loads at which food production can be sustained; and total consumption of all easily 
accessible fossil fuel resources, particularly higher grades of oil and gas. One way of 
interpreting the above conditions for sustainable energy development is to use fossil fuels 
as an endowment for preparing the necessary long-term transition towards a non-fossil, 
sustainable energy system. 
Figure 3.1 Global primary energy use 1850 to present (Gtoe), by source and total (stacked totals) 
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3 Trends in energy use 
5.3 
2000 
Global primary energy use has increased by a factor of 20 since the middle of the 
nineteenth century; an average annual growth rate of 2.2% per year (Figure 3.1). Global 
primary energy use, including traditional fuels, around 1860 amounted to less than 0.5 
Gtoe (gigatons {billion tons} oil equivalent). It took about 40 years to double this 
consumption: by the turn of the century global primary energy use surpassed one Gtoe 
and by the 1940s, 2 Gtoe. The next two doublings took only about 20 years each: by the 
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early 1960s global energy use surpassed 4 Gtoe and exceeded 8 Gtoe at the beginning of 
the 1980s. In 1994 global primary energy use amounted to 9.1 Gtoe [21, 12]. 
There is a considerable variation in energy consumption growth rates over time and 
between different world regions. For example, global fossil energy consumption grew at 
5% per year between 1950 and 1970, at 2.3% per year between 1970 and 1990, and at 
only 0.3% per year between 1990 and 1994. At the same time, the mix of primary energy 
sources has changed dramatically. 
The legacy of the tremendous expansion in the use of predominantly fossil fuels has, 
however, also become apparent. Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution the 
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide increased from 280 ppmv (parts per million 
by volume) to 358 ppmv in 1994 (see Figure 1.1 above) . 
3. 1 The role of technological change 
The history of economic growth and development is mirrored by corresponding increases 
in energy use. In turn, the increased availability of energy has enabled economic and 
human development. The enormous growth in economic output and energy use was both 
driven and enabled by continuous structural and technological changes. 
Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, two 'grand transitions' have shaped 
structural changes in energy systems at all levels . The first was initiated with a radical 
technological end-use innovation: the steam engine powered by coal. The steam cycle 
represented the first conversion of fossil energy sources into work; it allowed energy 
services to be site independent since coal could be transported and stored as needed, and 
it permitted power densities that were previously only possible in exceptional locations of 
abundant hydropower. Stationary steam engines were first introduced for lifting water 
from coal mines, thereby facilitating increased coal production. Later, they provided 
stationary power for what was to become an entirely new form of organizing production: 
the factory system. Mobile steam engines, on locomotives and steam ships, enabled the 
first transport revolution as railway networks were extended to even the most remote 
locations and ships converted from sail to steam. Characteristic energy consumption 
levels during the 'steam age', approximately the mid-nineteenth century in the UK, were 
about 2 toe per capita per year. By the turn of the twentieth century, coal had replaced 
traditional non-fossil energy sources and supplied virtually all the primary energy needs 
of industrialized countries. 
The second grand transition was the increased diversification of both energy end-use 
technologies and energy supply sources. Perhaps the most important single innovation 
was the introduction of electricity as the first energy carrier to be easily converted to 
light, heat or work at the point of end use. A second key innovation was the internal 
combustion engine that revolutionized individual and public transport through the use of 
cars, buses and aircraft. Like the transition triggered by the steam engine, this 
'diversification transition' was led by technological innovations in energy end use, such 
as the electric light bulb, the electric motor, the microchip and the computer, the internal 
combustion engine and aircraft. However, changes in energy supply have been equally 
far-reaching. In particular, oil emerged from being an expensive curiosity at the end of 
the nineteenth century to reaching the dominant global position it has occupied for the 
last 30 years. 
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3.2 Historical trends by energy source 
The dynamics of structural changes in the global energy system are illustrated in Figure 
3.2, showing the relative shares of different primary energy sources in the global primary 
energy supply. Structural changes of the global energy system can be characterized by 
relatively slow rates of change, which are typical for infrastructures. It took about half a 
century before coal was replaced by crude oil as the dominant global energy source. At 
the global level, the 'time constant' for fundamental energy transitions has been in the 
order of 50 years. At a regional level and for individual energy technologies and devices, 
the characteristic time constants are usually shorter as a result of faster capital turnover, 
among other factors [22]. 
Figure 3.2 Shares of different primary energy sources in global energy supply: 1850 to present, in 
percent. The data on traditional renewables are uncertain 
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Source: IIASA-WEC, [12] and BP, [21] 
The lifetime of energy equipment, and hence the turnover and capital stock replacement 
rate, is generally shorter the closer the equipment is to the end-user. Typical end-use 
devices such as light bulbs are usually replaced within one year. Household devices, e.g., 
stereo equipment, within ten years and residential capital equipment, e.g., boiler for a 
heating system, within 20 years. Conversely, the lifetimes of energy facilities are much 
longer: fossil power plants and renewable energy projects in the range of 30 years. Yet 
longer useful lives are observed for large hydro-schemes (dams) and for infrastructures 
(railway lines, roads, underground cables). The representative lifetime of energy facilities 
of 30 to 50 years implies that the totality of the energy sector capital stock will be 
replaced at least twice before the end of the twenty-first century offering numerous 
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opportunities for efficiency improvements and for restructuring the energy system away 
from fossil fuels. 
3.3 Trends in energy use by sector 
Sectoral energy use patterns vary considerably across different world regions and 
countries. From 9 Otoe primary energy consumed worldwide in 1990, about 6.5 Otoe 
were delivered to final use, implying an overall primary to final energy conversion 
efficiency of about 72%. The 6.5 Otoe final energy is divided unequally among sectors. 
The largest share of about 40% is due to combined energy use in agriculture, households 
and commercial sectors, including the direct use of traditional, non-commercial fuels 
collected and consumed locally. The next largest share of about 31 % is accounted for by 
industrial energy uses and another 6% by industrial feedstock requirements (non-energy 
uses of fossil fuels). Globally, the transport sector has the lowest share of about 23% in 
all final energy use , but the highest growth rate of all sectoral energy uses [23]. Table 3.1 
disaggregates this global situation in 1990 by major developing world regions and by 
three global 'macro-regions' as defined by the Climate Convention: the OECD, the 
reforming (transition) economies (REFs) and the developing countries (DCs). Table 3.2 
gives the corresponding average annual growth rates between 1970 and 1990. 
In the OECD countries, final energy consumption is almost equally distributed among 
the three sectoral uses given in Table 3. l. In the reforming economies, industrial uses 
account for by far the largest share and in developing countries, agricultural, household 
and commercial activities. In both the OECD and developing countries, the highest rates 
of growth are transportation energy requirements. Industrial energy use has actually 
decreased in the OECD countries. In contrast, industrial energy use is growing rapidly in 
developing countries due to economic development and industrialization. 
Table 3.1 1990 primary and final energy use by sector, for three world macro-regions and for six 
developing regions, in Mtoe 
OECO" REF sh DCs'" AFR MEA CPA SAS PAS I.AM WORLD 
Primary 41 81.0 1738.8 3056.2 287.5 348.5 944.8 443 .7 424.0 607.8 8976.0 
Final incl. 2881.2 1200.0 2368.7 221.8 237 .8 751.0 356.4 343.4 458.3 6449.9 
Industry 799.6 551.7 676.3 33.3 71.4 338.9 74.6 67.3 90.9 2027 .6 
Transport 907.8 167.0 380. l 24.9 106.8 49.l 35.6 56.3 107.5 1454.8 
Others d 918. l 433.0 1249.6 160.7 50.3 355.9 241.4 205.2 236.I 2600.7 
Feed stocks' 255.7 48.3 62.7 2.9 9.3 7.2 4.9 14.6 23.8 366.7 
Source: Based on !EA, (14] statistics and WEC, [24] 
For definitions of regional abbreviations see Figure 2.1 
"FCCC Annex II countries. 
~FCCC Annex I countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy. 
' Developing countries 
dlncludes non-commercial fuels. 
"Non-energy uses. 
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Table 3.2 Primary and final energy use by sector, for three world macro-regions and for six 
developing regions. Average annual growth rates 1970-1990 
OECD REFs DCs AFR MEA CPA SAS PAS I.AM WORLD 
Primary 1.3 2.6 4.5 3.5 7.7 4.7 4 .2 4.1 3.8 2.5 
Final incl. 0.9 2.2 4.0 2.9 7.4 4.3 3.7 3.3 3.4 2.1 
Industry -0.4 l.6 4.2 2.2 6.7 3.3 6.2 7.4 4.5 l.4 
Transport 2.2 2.0 5.8 2.1 11.8 5.3 4.0 7. 7 3.9 2.9 
Others 0.7 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.6 5.2 3.1 2.3 2.6 2.2 
Feed stocks 2.0 2.7 7.9 5.2 8.2 20.8 l.5 10.7 7.8 2.7 
Numbers in italics indicate growth rates above average 
Date source: see Table 3.1 
3.4 Trends in energy patterns by region 
Much of the historical increase in global primary energy consumption has occurred in the 
more developed countries. While they still consume two thirds of all primary energy, 
their share is declining as the world develops. Energy consumption is growing rapidly, 
especially in the economies undergoing vigorous development in some regions of Asia 
and most of the increases in future energy consumption can be expected to occur in what 
are now developing countries. 
Figure 3.3 Global fossil primary energy use since 1850, industrialized 1·ersus developing 
countries, in Gtoe. 
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Figure 3.3 shows global primary energy consumption since 1850 disaggregated into 
industrialized and developing countries. It clearly illustrates that most of the historical 
and present energy consumption is indeed accounted for by the now industrialized 
regions of the world. It also shows that during most of the present century, growth rates 
of energy consumption in the developing economies exceeded those of the industrialized 
countries by a wide margin, albeit at substantially lower absolute consumption levels. 
Table 3.3 documents some of these differences in the levels of primary energy use 
and the average annual growth rates between three 'macro-regions' of the world. 
Especially high are the growth rates of fossil energy consumption in the developing 
countries, in particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, averaging almost 9% per year. This 
illustrates the rapid replacement of traditional by commercial (fossil) energy forms in 
addition to and beyond the increase in energy consumption along with economic 
development in these regions. Although the growth rates have slowed down over the last 
decade, this process still continues today. 
Table 3.3 Levels of total primary energy use, total and fossil energy (in parentheses) in Gtoe 
(top part) and average annual growth rates for selected periods, in percent per year 
(bottom part) for three macro-regions of tlie world as defined by the Climate 
Convention. 
/11 Gtoe" 1850 1900 1950 1970 1990 1994 b 
OE CDC .4 (<.I) .9 ( .5) 1.4 (1.2) 3.1 (2.8) 4.2 (3.4) 4.4 (3 .7) 
REFsd 
-(<. I) .3 ( .3) 1.0 ( 1.0) 1.7 ( 1.6) 1.4 ( 1.2) 
DCsc 
-(<. I) .4 ( . I) I. I ( .6) 3.1 (1.9) 3.3 (2.2) 
World >.4(<.l) > .9 ( >.5) 2.1 ( 1.6) 5.2 (4.4) 9.0 (6.9) 9.1 (7.0) 
1850-1900 1900-1950 1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-1994 Total 
eriod 1 
OECD' -(4.6) - (2.0) 4.0 (4.2) 1.6 ( 1.0) 1.4 (1.7) 2.7 (2.5) 
REFsd - (4 .1) 5.7 (6.4) 2.8 (2.4) -6.4 (-7 .2) 3.2 (4.1) 
DCsc 
- (3.8) 5.1 (8.9) 5.1 (6.3) 2.3 (3.2) 4.8 (6.9) 
World 1.7 (4 .9) 1.7 (2.3) 4.5 (5.0) 2.8 (2.3) 0.4 (0.3) 2.2 (3 .5) 
"Include feedstock uses of energy, and non-commercial and renewable energy 
hPreliminary data 
' FCCC Annex II countries 
dFCCC Annex I countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy 
coeveloping countries 
rPeriod for which data are available 
3.5 Energy intensities of economic activities 
Another important effect of economic development and technological change is their 
impact on energy intensities. Energy intensities express the amount of energy required 
per unit of economic output, usually measured by GDP, either for the economy at large or 
for particular sectors/activities. The principal impact of technological change is that it 
stimulates efficiency improvements and structural changes in economic activities, thus 
generally lowering energy intensities. 
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The causes of energy intensity decreases are many and complex. They include, first, 
technological improvements in individual energy end use and conversion components -
for example, a more efficient stove or a more efficient power plant; structural shifts in the 
energy system, such as moving from coal-fired electricity generation to a gas-fired 
combined cycle plant; and interfuel substitution at the level of energy end use, like the 
replacement of fuel-wood by Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG). They include economic shifts 
from more to less energy-intensive activities, and changing patterns of energy end uses, 
and ultimately , changing lifestyles. Not every change in every one of these categories 
represents a decrease in energy intensity but taken together, the overall trends are 
persistent and pervasive. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the scale of energy intensity improvements since the onset of the 
Industrial Revolution for total and commercial primary energy, respectively. Energy 
intensities for developing and transitional economies are expressed per unit of GDP based 
on market exchange rates (GDP111"') and based on purchasing power parities (GDPrrr). 
Figure 3.4 Primary energy intensity for selected countries, total and commercial energy, in kgoe 
per US( I 990)$. Intensities are given both for GDP ma and GDPrrr· (For USA and Japan 
GDP ma :::::: GDPPPP) 
Data sources: Nakicenovic, [27] ; Martin, [28] and TERI, [29] 
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Aggregate energy intensities, including noncommercial energy, generally improve over 
time and this is true in all countries. A unit of GDP in the USA, for example, now 
requires less than one-fifth of the primary energy needed 200 years ago [27]. This 
corresponds to an average annual decrease in energy intensity of roughly one percent per 
year. The process is not always smooth, as data from other countries illustrate. Periods of 
rapid improvements are interlaced with periods of stagnation. Energy intensities may 
even rise in the early takeoff stages of industrialization, when an energy and materials-
intensive industrial and infrastructure base needs to be developed. 
While aggregate energy intensities generally improve over time, commercial energy 
intensities follow a different path. They first increase, reach a maximum and then 
decrease. The initial increase is due to commercial energy carriers substituting for 
traditional energy forms and technologies. Once that process is largely complete, 
commercial energy intensities decrease in line with the pattern found for aggregate 
energy intensities. Because most statistics document only modern, commercial energy 
use, this 'hill of energy intensity' has been discussed frequently in the literature (e.g. 
[30]). Its existence in the case of commercial energy intensities, however, does not 
diminish the power of the result for aggregate energy intensities - there is a decisive, 
consistent long-term trend toward improved energy intensity across a wide array of 
national experiences. 
History matters. While the trend is one of conditional convergence across countries, 
the patterns of energy intensity improvements in different countries reflect their different 
situations and development histories. Economic development is a cumulative process, 
incorporating in different countries different consumption lifestyles, different settlement 
patterns and transport requirements, different industrial structures and different takeoff 
dates into industrialization. Thus the evolution of national energy intensities is path 
dependent. In Figure 3.4, for example, there is an evident distinction between the 'high 
intensity' energy development trajectory of the USA and the 'high efficiency' trajectory 
of Japan. 
3.6 Carbon dioxide emissions and carbon intensities 
Energy extraction, conversion and end use impact on the environment at all levels: local, 
regional and global. At the global level, the emissions of so-called greenhouse gases 
could possibly lead to irreversible global climate change. Energy is the most important 
single source of greenhouse gases. It contributes about two thirds of all anthropogenic 
sources of carbon dioxide emissions, the most important of all greenhouse gases and is 
also a major source of methane, the second most important greenhouse gas. 
Figure 3.5 shows 1990 per capita, energy-related and non-energy (e.g., deforestation) 
carbon dioxide emissions in a number of world regions by source and relates these to the 
respective population size. The area of each bar is proportional to total carbon dioxide 
emissions in the particular region. The current levels of per capita, fossil-fuel carbon 
emissions across the world regions differ by a factor of 30. A persistent per capita 
emission gap remains even after including carbon emissions from land-use changes, 
currently concentrated in tropical latitudes. 
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Figure 3.5 1990 per capita C02 emissions (tons C per capita) per region and source, fossil fuels 
and range for biota sources compared to population (million) 
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Figure 3.6 shows the history of global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by major 
source of primary energy. The largest single source of fossil fuel carbon emissions is 
coal, with currently about a 43% share, followed by oil with about 39% and natural gas 
with 18%. Adding non-energy uses of fossil fuels, such as industrial feedstocks, reverses 
the shares to 40% for coal and 42% for oil. 
Figure 3.6 Global fossil energy emissions by source (stacked totals) . Emissions also include fuel-
wood, that if used sustainably does not contribute to atmospheric concentration 
increase 
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Figure 3.7 shows the process of 'decarbonization' as the decreasing carbon intensity of 
primary energy, that is, the ratio of average carbon emissions per unit of primary energy. 
The ratio decreases due to the continuous replacement of fuels with high carbon contents, 
such as coal, by those with lower carbon content or carbon-free sources such as 
renewables and nuclear energy. At the global level, decarbonization of energy occurs at a 
slow rate of about 0.3% per year. This falls short by about 1.9% of what would be 
required to offset the effects of the long-term, global growth in primary energy 
consumption of about 2.2% per year. This means that global carbon dioxide emissions 
have been increasing at close to 2% per year, implying - in the absence of policy 
measures - a doubling before the 2020s. This is, in fact, quite close to the emission levels 
projected in many of the global 'business as usual' emissions scenarios [31] 
Figure 3. 7 Carbon intensity of global primary energy 1850-1990 in tons C per toe 
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Five representative countries have been selected here to demonstrate the different 
national experiences in carbon intensities. For example, the USA has one of the highest 
energy intensities of the industrialized countries and also one of the highest per capita 
carbon emissions in the world. France and Japan, on the other hand, have among the 
lowest carbon intensities but for different reasons: in Japan this has been achieved largely 
through structural changes in the energy system by substituting coal with oil and natural 
gas, and in France largely through the vigorous substitution of fossil fuels by nuclear 
energy . Finally, China and India represent two rapidly developing countries where the 
replacement of traditional by fossil energy is still incomplete, resulting in very high 
energy and carbon intensities. Together, these five countries account for almost half of 
the global energy consumption and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. Figure 3.8 
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shows the historical evolution of carbon intensity of energy for these five countries. It is 
noteworthy that decarbonization has occurred in all of these five countries despite their 
diversity. However, without continuing structural changes in the energy system towards 
less carbon intensive and carbon free sources of energy, trend reversals cannot be 
excluded in the future. 
Figure 3.8 Carbon intensity of primary energy for selected countries, in tons C per toe 
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3. 7 Contributions to atmospheric concentration increases 
The industrialized countries account for some 70% of the present carbon dioxide 
emissions. They are also responsible for most of the historical emissions. Although at 
much lower absolute levels, the emissions of developing countries are growing more 
rapidly than in the industrialized ones. Figure 3.9 shows the history of fossil energy 
carbon dioxide emissions by major world regions. Some 240 GtC (Gigatons, or billion 
tons, of elemental carbon) have been released into the atmosphere by energy-related 
activities. This is much larger than the estimated carbon release from deforestation and 
land-use changes over the same period of some 120 GtC [33]. 
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Figure 3.9 Global energy-related carbon emissions by major world region (stacked totals), in GtC 
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The significant divide between developed and developing countries in current fossil 
energy carbon emissions becomes even larger when considering their historical 
dimension : because of the long lifetime of atmospheric carbon, estimates indicate that 
about 84% of the fossil energy carbon dioxide emissions since 1800 still remaining in the 
atmosphere can be attributed to the past emissions of the now industrialized countries 
[25]. Some of the carbon dioxide emitted by James Watt's first steam engine is still 
airborne. At the other extreme, the share of developing countries in energy related 
atmospheric carbon dioxide buildup is, at 16%, very low, especially in view of the fact 
that about 70% of the people that have lived on earth since 1800 reside(d) in these 
countries [25). The upper part of Figure 3.10 summarizes the regional breakdown of 
energy-related carbon dioxide emissions at the end of the 1980s, and the lower part 
shows the contribution of each region to atmospheric concentration increases over the 
entire period since 1800. 
The significant differences in historical contributions to atmospheric concentration 
increases between industrialized and developing countries are somewhat reduced when 
the analysis is extended to all sources and species of greenhouse gases. Nevertheless, the 
preponderance of the industrialized countries persists [25]. The differences in recent and 
historical shares of the potential 'global warming pie' between regions illustrate the 
implications of considering the actions of past generations, in addition to the 
responsibilities to be assumed by present and future generations, in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation efforts (see [26]). This asymmetry is also reflected in the FCCC 
through the concept of 'common, but differentiated responsibilities' and the specific 
commitments contained in the Convention for industrialized countries [IO], particularly 
those not undergoing a process of transition to a market economy (FCCC Annex II 
countries, corresponding to the OECD members with the exception of Mexico). 
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Figure 3.10 Shares (in percent) of different world regions in current (top) and their contribution 
to historical (S ince 1800) concentration increases of energy-related carbon emissions 
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4 Impacts on the atmosphere 
4.1 Scientific understanding of climate change 
The large variations in the atmosphere on an hourly or daily basis constitute the weather. 
It is governed by nonlinear 'chaotic' dynamics and is therefore not predictable in the 
deterministic sense beyond a week or two in the future [34]. A common definition of 
climate refers to the average weather, usually described in terms of mean and other 
statistical quantities that measure variability over a period of time and given geographical 
area [34] . Mean climate is also variable over different temporal and spatial scales. For the 
longer time-scales of decades to centuries associated with the change of climate due to 
the effect of enhanced greenhouse warming, the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (FCCC) defines the climate system as the "totality of the atmosphere, 
hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and their interactions" [ 1 O] . According to the 
Second Assessment Report (SAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), often 'climate change' denotes those variations due to human interference while 
'climate variations' refers to the natural ones [34]. 
Atmospheric trace gases help to regulate the temperature regime of the earth. 
Radiation from the sun is the source of energy which drives the climate system. Incoming 
solar radiation warms the surface of the earth. Much of this energy is in the visible part of 
the electromagnetic spectrum. To balance the incoming energy from the sun, the earth 
itself must radiate on average the same amount of energy back to space by emitting in the 
infrared part of the spectrum. Part of the re-emitted radiant heat is trapped by trace gases 
in the atmosphere producing the 'greenhouse effect'. 
Figure 4.1 Schematic illustration of the earth's radiative balance, in Watts per m2 
Source: IPCC SAR WG I, [34] 
radiation 
343 wm·2 
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Most of the atmosphere consists of nitrogen and oxygen which are both transparent to 
infrared radiation. These two gases constitute 99% of dry air. The most important 
infrared absorbing atmospheric gases are water vapour and carbon dioxide which account 
for 90% of the natural greenhouse effect. In addition to water vapour and carbon dioxide, 
other greenhouse gases include methane, nitrous oxide and tropospheric ozone. Figure 
4.1 gives a schematic illustration of the earth's radiation and energy balance. Without all 
of these radiatively active gases that absorb infrared radiation, the surface temperature of 
the earth would be some 30 degrees Kelvin lower and earth would be inhabitable to life 
as we know it. This natural greenhouse effect is also involved in governing the surface 
temperature of the neighbouring plants Venus and Mars. 
Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution human activities have not only increased 
the atmospheric concentrations of naturally occurring greenhouse gases, but have also 
added new ones. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) also produce a greenhouse effect, although 
this is offset somewhat by the observed decrease in stratospheric ozone since the 1970s 
caused principally by CFCs and halons (33]. Human activities have altered the 
concentrations of greenhouse gases both directly by anthropogenic emissions of carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and CFCs and indirectly by influencing the complex 
atmospheric chemistry, including increases in stratospheric water vapour concentrations, 
depletion of stratospheric ozone and increases of tropospheric ozone concentrations. 
Human activities also affect the amount of aerosols in the atmosphere which 
influences climate in other ways They scatter some incoming solar radiation back to 
space and thereby cool the earth's surface. A further effect of aerosols is that many of 
them act as nuclei on which cloud droplets condensate and hence alter the reflection and 
the absorption of solar radiation by the clouds. Aerosols occur naturally in the 
atmosphere, e.g., from the eruption of volcanoes or by being blown off the surface of 
deserts. Sulphur dioxide from coal power plants and biomass burning are the main 
aerosols resulting from human activities. Previously this was thought to have only local 
smog and regional acidic precipitation impacts. Recent IPCC findings indicate that some 
of the net climate warming resulting from the increased concentrations of greenhouse 
gases is being partially offset by increased concentrations of sulphur dioxide. Because 
human-made aerosols typically remain in the atmosphere for only a few days they tend to 
be concentrated near their sources such as industrial regions. However, the aerosol effects 
do not cancel the global-scale effects of the much longer-lived greenhouse gases and 
significant climate changes can still result especially once aerosol emissions are 
effectively controlled to combat local and regional air pollution (34]. 
Analysis of observations of surface temperature indicates that there has been a global 
mean warming of 0.3 to 0.6 degrees Kelvin during the last 100 years. The observed trend 
of a larger increase in minimum than maximum temperatures is apparently linked to 
associated increases in low clouds and aerosols as well as the enhanced greenhouse effect 
[34]. In addition, the warmest seven years on observed record have occurred since the 
early 1980s. The last 15 years have on average probably been warmer than any similar 
period during the last 600 years [5]. 
It is also known that the 250 GtC of carbon dioxide emitted due to fossil fuel use and 
some 120 GtC emitted due to deforestation and biomass burning have increased the 
atmospheric carbon dioxide content by about 28% compared to pre-industrial 
concentration levels. Concentrations of other greenhouse gases such as methane, nitrous 
oxide and CFCs have also increased markedly. Their total combined effect, without that 
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of water vapour, is at present equivalent to an increase in carbon dioxide of almost 50% 
[5]. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine reliably the combined effect of 
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases and other effects of human activities on 
the climate system. Instead, theoretical models of the atmosphere are used to determine 
the resulting increase in the global mean temperature leading to a range of 0.8 to 2.2 
degrees Kelvin calculated warming. The inertia of the climate system compared with the 
comparatively fast rates of greenhouse gas concentration increases delay in the resulting 
climate change by 30 to 50%. In addition, the anthropogenic sources of aerosols, 
principally sulphur dioxide, diminish the theoretical global warming effect by another 20 
to 40%. Thus, the observed climate change of 0.3 to 0.6 degrees Kelvin is in the lower 
part of what would be theoretically expected [5]. 
Figure 4.2 compares these theoretical estimates of global mean warming due to the 
increased concentrations of greenhouse gases, with and without the effect of enhanced 
cooling due to increased emissions of aerosols, with the observed trend in global mean 
warming. In its recent Synthesis Report about information relevant for the FCCC, the 
IPCC concludes that this observed global mean temperature increase "is unlikely to be 
due entirely to natural fluctuations of the climate system, although this explanation 
cannot be ruled out" [6] . Therefore, scientific evidence is strong that human activities 
have already caused climate change. 
Figure 4.2 Observations in changes in global mean surface temperature from 1860 to the present 
(curve ending in 1990). Also shown are results of two model calculations to 2050 with 
(lower curve) and without (upper curve) the impact of sulphur aerosols. 
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The FCCC recognizes that human activities may be causing irreversible climate change 
and that preventive measures should be taken. Its prime objective as expressed in its 
Article 2 is the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" 
[!OJ . 
Because of the difficulty in predicting the magnitude and geographical distribution of 
climate change, determination of what might be considered to be 'dangerous' levels of 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system is primarily a policy rather than a 
scientific question. People have adapted with varying degrees of success to natural 
climate variability in the past. Since there is great uncertainty about where, how quickly 
and how severe adverse impacts of climate change might be and what the potential 
benefits might be, this analysis will focus on possible strategies to stabilize greenhouse 
concentrations at alternative levels. 
Leaving aside the question of determining 'dangerous ' levels of greenhouse gases, 
other problems are posed by the objective to stabilize their concentrations. It is known 
that enhanced concentrations of most greenhouse gases remain on average in the 
atmosphere for 50 to 100 years. An exception is methane with a lifetime of somewhat 
more than a decade. This has two important implications for sustainable development. 
First, a significant decrease in greenhouse warming might take half a century or more 
even after stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations [5J. Second, the long time scale of 
climate change and the atmospheric lifetimes of most greenhouse gases are almost 
matched by the long time scales of replacing human infrastructures, such as the energy 
system. Even if emissions were immediately stabilized, the long-time constants of the 
atmosphere system imply a lag of many decades to centuries before stabilization of 
concentrations is achieved and an equivalent lag before stabilization of temperature 
occurs. 
4.2 Range of future emissions 
The crucial scientific question in the context of possible climate change is to determine 
different greenhouse gas emissions scenarios that bracket a sufficiently wide range of 
alternative atmospheric concentration levels. By doing so one can explicitly specify 
alternative energy development paths that correspond to different concentration levels 
and thus aid the policy process of identifying stabilization of concentrations at a "level 
that would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system" [ 1 OJ. 
Figure 4.3 shows historical carbon dioxide emissions levels and a wide range of 
alternative future trajectories from the literature. The lower ones lead to stabilization of 
concentrations levels, while the high emission paths imply a continuous increase of 
concentrations beyond the end of the next century. A number of alternative stabilization 
levels and emission pathways leading to them are illustrated including 450 parts per 
million by volume ( ppmv), 550 ppmv (doubling of pre-industrial concentration), and 
ranging to quite high concentrations up to 750 ppmv. The alternative scenarios in Figure 
4.3 have in common a doubling of the global population to about 12 billion by the end of 
the next century. For simplicity, only two sets of scenarios are shown. 
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Figure 4.3 Historical and range of future emission paths of energy related carbon emissions based 
on two sets of representative scenarios with a medium population projection from the 
IPCC (IS92 series) and IIASA-WEC (Al to C). Also shown are illustrative emission 
paths that would lead to a long-term stabilization of atmospheric concentrations at 
levels of 450, 550, 650 and 750 ppmv respectively. 
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One is based on the scenarios developed by IPCC from a whole range of varying 
assumptions including alternative future population levels. Shown are the central and the 
highest scenarios [36] that share the same population assumption. For comparison the 
dotted lines in Figure 4.3 show the lowest IPCC scenario (IS92c). This scenario leads to 
stabilization of concentrations at a relatively low level of 450 ppmv because it is based on 
modest economic growth and an insignificant increase in world population to 6.3 billion 
by 2100. The IS92 set of IPCC scenarios is considered as one of the standard references 
in the literature. 
The other set of scenarios stems from a joint study by the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the World Energy Council (WEC) on long-term 
global energy perspectives [ 12,35]. The set includes six scenarios based on a common 
intermediate population projection. The six scenarios range from very low emission 
levels leading to stabilization at 450 ppmv to very high emission paths that imply 
continuing increases in concentrations beyond 2100. The three scenarios labelled Al, A2 
and A3 are of particular interest because they are all based on the same high levels of 
economic growth and energy consumption in the world. Alternative structures of the 
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economy and energy system, however, lead to radically different emissions. In scenario 
A I, for example, which is based on increasing shares of natural gas, emissions reach 15 
GtC in 2100. In the coal-intensive A2 scenario, they reach 22 GtC. In scenario A3, which 
is based on a larger contribution of nuclear and renewable energy sources, emissions 
reach only 7GtC, which is comparable to current emissions levels. This last scenario is 
consistent with concentration stabilization at 550 ppmv despite high levels of economic 
and energy growth. It illustrates that sustainable energy development need not be 
associated with austerity measures. The emissions in scenario B are comparable to those 
of A3 scenario by 2050 but then increase to twice the level of A3 by 2100 due to a lack of 
significant structural changes in the energy system and a continuing reliance on carbon-
intensive sources of energy. 
The two C scenarios are a special case because they were constructed to stabilize 
emissions at current levels by the mid-21 st century in order to meet an emissions ceiling 
of 2 GtC by 2100 [37] . Such an emission profile would lead to stabilization of 
concentrations at the comparatively low level of 450 ppmv. This assumes a new regime 
of global environmental governance, including full implementation of the FCCC with 
ensuing emission control protocols and aggressive international cooperation centred 
around environmental protection and international economic equity. Stabilization at 450 
ppmv can be considered to ensure sustainability from the point of view of possible 
climate change. Few would argue that 450 ppmv is a 'dangerously' high concentration 
level for future generations . In contract to the IPCC IS92c scenario that achieved 
stabilization via extremely low (exogenous) demographic and economic growth 
assumptions, this scenario achieves stabilization at 450 ppmv levels due to deliberate 
policy action in a world of 12 billion people and with a significant reduction in current 
economic disparities between world regions. 
The scenarios shown in Figure 4.3 span a very wide range of possible future carbon 
dioxide emissions, from two to 36 GtC by 2100, from a stabilization of concentrations at 
a low level of 450 ppmv to a continuous increase beyond a doubling of current 
concentrations that is reached as early as the 2070s. This range includes the majority of 
emission scenarios available in the literature [31 ]. 
The analysis of alternative scenarios indicates that their cumulative emissions over 
time are the single most important characteristic for determining the level of future 
greenhouse gas concentrations. This is an important and a robust result [5]. It means that 
the shape of the emissions paths is not that crucial as long as the total emissions are not 
changed by a given period. For example, scenarios that foresee a more rapid increase in 
emissions to begin with would have to have a faster decline later on to achieve the same 
level of stabilization. What is common to all of the paths that lead to stabilization is that 
their emissions must fall to 3GtC or less per year by the time stabilization is achieved. 
This emissions level corresponds to the capacity of natural sinks to absorb additional 
carbon dioxide emitted to the atmosphere. 
An overall result of this analysis is that scenarios that lead to stabilization at levels of 
about 450 ppmv have cumulative emissions in the range of about 600 GtC by 2100. 
Scenarios with cumulative emissions of more that 1,000 GtC by 2100, result in 
concentrations of more than 550 ppmv, or more than double the pre-industrial levels. 
Scenarios in excess of 1,000 GtC cumulative emissions by 2100 lead to continuing 
increases in concentration levels extending beyond that period. In comparison, the current 
atmospheric carbon dioxide content is about 760 GtC. Therefore, sustainable energy 
development from the point of view of the current understanding of possible climate 
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change implies cumulative carbon dioxide emissions by 2100 in the range of less than 
1,000 GtC. 
Most of the scenarios that lead to emissions in this lower range of the scale involve 
active measures to change the structure of future energy systems so as to lead to lower 
environmental impacts and at the same time providing sufficient energy for economic 
development in the world. As an illustration that such transitions to lower future 
greenhouse gas emissions paths should not be considered to occur automatically, suffice 
it to say that the currently known reserves of conventional fossil energy in the world are 
estimated at 3,000 to 5,000 GtC, an amount that by far exceeds the above cumulative 
emissions levels. The total occurrences of fossil deposits in the earth's crust that might be 
in theory available to humanity as a 'carbon endowment' are estimated to be in the range 
of 25,000 GtC [34]. 
It has already been mentioned that the historical responsibility for the current 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations beyond the pre-industrial levels rests with the 
now developed parts of the world. They are responsible for more than 80% of this 
increase. In the future, most scenarios indicate that the share of global emissions from the 
currently developing countries would increase as they industrialize and their levels of 
affluence reach those now prevailing in the developed parts of the world. By the end of 
the next century, the now developing countries may account for anywhere between 60 
and more than 80% of global greenhouse gas emissions. This also means that global 
emission reduction strategies must take into account the future energy perspectives of the 
developing countries. It can be argued that this puts an additional responsibility on the 
now developed countries to set an example and develop the required technologies, 
institutions and policy measures to achieve emissions reductions. These countries not 
only have the required know-how and experience but also possess the majority of the 
financial and institutional resources needed for developing the necessary preconditions 
for sustainable energy development. 
5 Options for mitigation and adaptation 
What are the options for the protection of the atmosphere? Mitigation and adaptation 
options and policy instruments for their implementation, need to be varied and 
comprehensive in view of the multitude of pollutants, the pervasiveness of emissions 
across a wide range of human activities, and the time scales involved in possible climate 
changes. The most obvious option to mitigate against undesirable impacts of unabated 
emissions is emission reduction. 
Modern societies depend on elaborate and complex systems for converting energy 
from less to more desirable forms. Losses occur in all these conversion processes and 
emissions of various pollutants are released into the atmosphere. The overall emissions 
released by the energy system depend on the structure and efficiencies of energy supply, 
conversion and end use. Emissions reductions can be achieved by efficiency 
improvements, fuel switching and structural change to cleaner energy forms and by 
technological means of reducing pollutants from large point sources. Two further 
mitigation options are the enhancement of greenhouse gas sinks and adaptation measures. 
These options and their mitigation and adaptation potential are assessed below. The final 
34 N. Nakicenovic and A. Grub/er 
part of this section (5.7) then reviews some special circumstances in different world 
regions. 
5.1 Efficiency improvement potentials 
Efficiency improvements constitute the most generic mitigation options. A more efficient 
provision of energy services not only reduces the amount of primary energy required but, 
in contrast to other options with single objectives of reducing emissions of a particular 
greenhouse gas, efficiency improvements also reduce adverse environmental impacts 
across all pollutants, resource use and energy costs. It is also the option that is generally 
considered to have the largest mitigation potential. However, although efficiency is 
important it is not the only determinant of all energy systems performance. Other 
determinants include, for example, the availability and controllability of energy flows, 
capital and operating costs, etc. Energy can be used more or less efficiently; this 
sometimes depends on technical factors or the capacity utilization, but more often it is a 
question of economic and social choice, i.e., the question of lifestyles and, consequently, 
the kinds of energy services that are demanded and provided. 
Figure 5.1 Global energy efficiency in 1990 (a), top, and efficiencies obtainable through the 
application of best available technologies (b), bottom; conversion efficiencies as 
percentages of primary energy 
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Energy efficiency is usually measured as the ratio of energy output to input. Measured 
this way, significant energy efficiency improvements have been achieved for almost all 
types of energy conversion facilities. For example, dramatic improvements in fuel 
conversion efficiencies in electricity generation have been achieved during this century. 
At the turn of the century the prevailing efficiency of electricity generation was about 
5%, whereas today the average efficiency in OECD countries is about 36% and the best 
combined-cycle natural gas-fired power plants can achieve more than 50% efficiency. To 
evaluate how large the improvement opportunities are, if, for example, the most efficient 
devices and systems are used, first the overall efficiency of the energy system has to be 
determined. This means calculating the aggregate efficiency of different energy chains 
(composed of many individual energy conversion devices) and then determining the 
weighted average efficiency of the entire energy system from primary to final and useful 
energy. The results from such an analysis are reported in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 shows that the average aggregate efficiency of energy transformation from 
primary to useful forms at the global level is about 34%. The highest efficiencies are in 
the conversion of fuels from primary to secondary energy forms. Refinery efficiencies are 
about 90% and, on average, the conversion, transport and distribution of energy has 
rather low losses with efficiencies ranging from about 60 to almost 90%. 
Overall, the primary to final energy conversion processes, i.e. the domain of the 
energy sector proper, are quite efficient with a global average of about 74%. In 
comparison, the final to useful energy conversion efficiency, the domain of the energy 
consumers, is very low with about 46% at the global level. In general, natural gas and 
electricity have the highest end-use efficiencies compared with the lowest primary to 
final conversion rates. The lowest end-use efficiencies are those of biomass with about 
17%, mainly as a result of the predominance of traditional end-use conversion devices in 
developing countries. 
As stated above, the overall primary to useful energy efficiencies are 34% at the 
global level. A similar analysis for different world regions [38] gives corresponding 
numbers of 22% in the developing countries and 42% in the eeonomies in transition. The 
latter result may at first sight be surprising. Generally, energy technologies of economies 
in transition are rather inefficient, especially when compared with the standards 
prevailing in the market economies of the OECD. All individual primary to useful energy 
chains are more efficient in the market than in the transition economies. The reason for 
the reverse situation with the overall aggregate systems efficiency is that the structure of 
the energy systems in the economies in transitionfavours collective consumption and 
thus also end-use efficiency. People travel by public transport rather than private cars and 
heat their homes using cogenerated heat rather than individual oil burners. Thus, while 
cars and buses are more fuel efficient in the market economies, travelling by bus in the 
economies in transition is more energy efficient than riding in a car in any of the OECD 
countries. 
The most important overall result is that energy end use is the least efficient part of all 
energy systems and it is in this area that improvements would bring the greatest benefits. 
It also shows that even the most efficient technologies may not be sufficient to offset the 
energy-intensive lifestyles prevailing in very affluent market economies. 
The largest relative efficiency improvement potential exists in the developing 
countries, followed by the transitional economies, because of the prevalence of traditional 
economic patterns and inefficient energy end use technologies in these areas. Outdated 
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technological vintages and, more generally, chronic capital shortages, limit the 
replacement of obsolete technologies and investment into new, more energy-efficient 
ones. The largest absolute efficiency improvement potential remains in the industrialized 
countries of the OECD, despite their generally more modern and energy efficient capital 
stock. This is simply because the absolute level of energy use in the OECD countries 
accounts for 4.4 Gtoe or half of global primary energy use. The application of today's 
efficiency levels of the market economies of the OECD to provide useful energy for the 
rest of the world would reduce the global primary energy requirements by 17%, from 9 to 
7.5 Gtoe, and would also lead to a similar reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. 
An instantaneous (hypothetical) replacement of the current global energy system by 
the best and most energy efficient technologies available would result in an overall 
primary to useful energy efficiency improvement of 60%, i.e., from 34% to 55% (Figure 
5.1 ). In other words, total primary energy requirements in this hypothetical scenario 
would decrease from about 9 to about 5 .5 Gtoe and, assuming no structural changes in 
the energy system, global carbon emissions would also be reduced correspondingly, from 
6 to 3.6 GtC. 
This assessment of the current to near-term energy efficiency improvement potential 
is corroborated by other studies [22]. This impressive efficiency improvement potential 
is, however, merely a technical potential. It ignores costs, the time it might take before 
new more energy-efficient technologies can be introduced, as well as the numerous 
institutional and social changes that would be necessary for their implementation. 
Considering these and, in particular, financial constraints, the technical potential reduces 
to a realizable efficiency improvement potential in the range of between ten to 30% of 
current energy use worldwide and is of a similar magnitude over reference baseline 
scenarios over the next two to three decades. This represents the economic potential of 
energy efficiency improvements: reductions in energy use that can be achieved at no 
additional cost and, in most cases, at significant cost savings to society (but not 
necessarily to individual consumers). 
The energy efficiency improvement potentials identified above represent current to 
near-term potentials. They are, however, inadequate as an assessment of the ultimate 
energy efficiency potential. A more appropriate measure for such an assessment is to 
determine the theoretical minimum energy requirements for a given task, as defined by 
the second law of thermodynamics (so-called exergy analysis). The distinction between 
energy and exergy efficiency is important because it allows the determination of the 
ultimate potential of efficiency improvements . The second law of thermodynamics 
defines a quantity called available work or exergy. It can be used instead of energy to 
define an alternative efficiency measure: the ratio of the theoretical minimum amount of 
available work or exergy needed to perform a particular task to actual available work or 
exergy consumed by a particular device or a system to perform the same task. 
A number of studies have analysed the efficiency of current energy systems using 
second-law or exergy analysis. All indicate that primary to service efficiencies are as low 
as a few percent. AIP [39] and later Oliver et al. [ 40] were among the first to give a 
detailed assessment of end-use exergy efficiencies, including service efficiencies. Ayres 
[ 41] calculated an overall primary exergy to service efficiency of 2.5% for the USA. 
Other estimates for individual countries range up to 15 to 23% [22] . Estimates of global 
and regional primary-to-service exergy efficiencies vary from ten to as low as a few 
percent [42,38]. 
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The results indicate that the theoretical potential for efficiency improvements is very 
large, ranging between a factor of five to 20. Current energy systems are nowhere close 
to the minimum energy requirements suggested by the second law of thermodynamics. 
This means that the current and future demand for energy services could be satisfied with 
as little as five to 20% of current energy use. These estimates do not involve changes of 
energy tasks or lifestyles. Allowing for such changes would make the efficiency 
improvement potential even higher. For example, such a change would be the satisfaction 
of mobility needs by public transport or by walking instead of a private car. Such an 
analysis indicates thermodynamically defined efficiency improvement potentials. The 
actual realization of these potentials depends on numerous factors and constraints, among 
others, technology development, transfer and diffusion, capital availability and 
appropriate economic and institutional incentives, including removal of barriers and 
distortionary subsidies. However, what can already be achieved with current best practice 
technologies and devices available on the market remains significant. The realization of 
this potential, however, presupposes the availability of financing and the existence of the 
appropriate incentives. 
5.2 Fuel switching and substitution 
Fuel switching is an option that involves structural shifts from emissions-intensive fossil 
fuels to cleaner ones. For instance, switching from coal to natural gas reduces carbon 
dioxide emissions and, at the same time, reduces particulates and sulphur dioxide 
emissions that constitute important local and regional air pollutants. About 43% of 
current energy-related carbon dioxide emissions originate from coal, about 39% from oil 
and 18% from natural gas [22]. Per unit energy, the carbon dioxide emissions of natural 
gas are only half as large as those of coal and three-quarters those of oil. Fuel switching, 
e .g., from coal to gas in electricity generation, therefore represents a considerable 
emission reduction potential. Past structural changes in energy supply, from coal 
dominated energy systems towards oil and, more recently, natural gas, have resulted in a 
continuous 'decarbonization' of the energy system. The global carbon dioxide emissions 
decreased per unit of primary energy used in the world as a consequence of structural 
changes in the energy system (cf. Section 3 above). 
The ultimate potential of emission reduction via fuel substitution is difficult to 
determine. Regional resource availability, trade possibilities, price differentials and 
geopolitical considerations may limit fuel substitution possibilities, e.g., of domestically 
produced coal by imported natural gas. The near term potential of fuel substitution is 
rather limited because the development of alternative energy supply sources, conversion 
facilities, end-use devices and the corresponding changes in infrastructures all take 
considerable time. 
Conversely, over longer time periods, the emission reduction potentials increase 
substantially. Illustrative scenarios, e.g., the 'methane economy' scenario developed by 
Ausubel et al. [43] indicate that duel substitution, in particular favouring natural gas and 
in conjunction with the enhanced penetration of zero-carbon options such as nuclear or 
renewables, could reduce emissions substantially compared to coal intensive 'business as 
usual' scenarios. These findings are corroborated by the IIASA-WEC long-term energy 
scenarios [ 12,35]. Carbon emissions by the end of the 21st century of a scenario relying 
on natural gas as a transitional fuel in conjunction with significant market penetration of 
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cost-effective nuclear and renewable energy sources, could amount to only 7 GtC, 
compared to 22 GtC for a similar, but coal and synfuels intensive, scenario. For both 
scenarios, global energy demand is projected to be five times higher than today. Figure 
5.2 illustrates the more near to medium-term potential of fuel substitution. Taking the 
coal intensive IS92a IPCC scenario (36] as a baseline, it illustrates the impact on carbon 
emissions of replacing all global coal consumption in the scenario by oil or natural gas 
respectively over the next 40 years (22]. This hypothetical calculation illustrates the 
magnitude of emission reductions via fuel switching among fossil fuels only. Shifting all 
coal use in the scenario to natural gas would reduce emissions by the year 2035 from over 
7GtC to some 4 GtC, i.e. by over 40%. 
Figure 5.2 An illustrative example of carbon dioxide emissions reduction through fossil fuel 
switching and substitution. Annual carbon emissions from coal in the (coal intensive) 
1S92a IPCC reference scenario and the corresponding emissions if oil and gas 
respectively would replace coal (in GtC) 
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The investments embodied in existing energy infrastructures and regional resource 
availabilities constrain the emissions reduction potentials of fuel substitution. In view of 
such constraints, this option would be more effective if it were combined with vigorous 
efficiency improvement efforts and ultimately with carbon scrubbing and disposal. 
5.3 Structural change to renewables and nuclear 
Strnct11ral change is an option that involves transformation of the energy system from the 
current predominance of fossil fuels towards carbon-free energy sources such as solar and 
nuclear, or towards sources that are carbon-neutral with respect to the atmosphere, such 
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as the sustainable use of biomass [ 44]. In the latter case, the atmospheric carbon dioxide 
released during combustion is absorbed during regrowth, hence its characterization as a 
carbon-neutral energy source. 
The emissions reduction potentials of carbon-free and neutral energy sources is large 
indeed and in the long run may exceed that of efficiency improvements. Studies indicate 
that over very long time scales (of one century) it would be possible to restructure the 
global energy system entirely away from the use of fossil fuels, especially when 
combined with vigorous conservation and energy efficiency improvement efforts 
[ 45, 12,22]. In practice many factors limit the mitigation potential of a structural change to 
carbon-free and carbon-neutral energy sources such as high costs, availability of 
technology and capital and other resource constraints. For example, competing land uses 
between agriculture and 'energy plantations' can limit the global mitigation potential of 
biomass. 
One of the most systematic analyses of the long-term potentials of renewables and 
nuclear energy was carried out for the World Energy Council's 1995 Congress in Tokyo 
[ 12]. In contrast to other studies that usually focus on one single energy demand scenario, 
a range of demand scenarios was explored with respect to alternative energy supply 
options. The study also considered international trade, technology availability and costs, 
as well as other possible constraints for the penetration of renewable and nuclear energy. 
Hence the resulting supply potentials identified represent a detailed techno-economic 
assessment rather than a mere illustration of technical or theoretical supply potentials. 
Figure 5.3 Minimum and maximum annual contribution of renewables, biomass and nuclear to 
global energy supply, from IIASA-WEC scenarios (in Gtoe) [ 12,35] 
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The resulting minima and maxima of all alternative contribution profiles for all carbon-
free and neutral options are presented in Figure 5.3. Three sets of minima and maxima 
are shown for new renewables (wind, solar or geothermal), sustainable biomass use and 
for nuclear energy. The range between the two extremes is the largest for nuclear energy 
due to the current uncertainties regarding proliferation, waste disposal and social 
acceptability issues. Nuclear energy ranges from a complete moratorium by the end of the 
21st century to a contribution of I 0 Gtoe, thus exceeding total current world energy use. 
For biomass the range extends from 4 to 9 Gtoe and for other renewables from 4 to 14 
Gtoe by the end of the 21st century. The carbon dioxide emissions mitigation potential of 
these energy sources depends on the structure of the fossil fuel mix; it depends primarily 
on whether they are substituting coal, oil or natural gas. The potentials are the highest 
when coal is substituted: worldwide by 2100, they are about 5 GtC in the case of new 
renewables and biomass minima, respectively (but zero for a nuclear moratorium); about 
10 GtC for biomass and nuclear maxima, respectively, and finally about 15 GtC for the 
new renewables maximum. In the case of natural gas substitution, the corresponding 
global mitigation potentials are somewhat smaller with 3, 5 and 9 GtC, respectively. 
The realization of the long-term mitigation potential of these options, however, 
requires near-term concerted research and development efforts. Technology 
demonstrations in initial niche markets to facilitate technological learning and cost 
reductions are required in order that these options become competitive with fossil fuels, 
particularly in the case of renewables and biomass. In the case of nuclear energy, 
acceptable responses need to be found to concerns about safety, waste disposal and 
proliferation issues . Hence, structural change would be also a more effective option if it 
were combined with vigorous energy efficiency improvement efforts. 
5.4 Control of large point sources 
Control of large point sources is an option that focuses primarily on emissions reduction 
from power plants and large energy conversion facilities, similar to the current 
technologies for reducing emissions of particulates matter, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxides. 
The theoretical emissions reduction potential of this option is substantial. Possible 
control measures include scrubbers for carbon dioxide removal that are applicable mostly 
to large fossil power plants and some industrial processes. In most cases the technological 
feasibility of emission control has been demonstrated although costs are still prohibitive 
in many cases. 
For example, the recovery of methane from coal mines is practiced widely and is 
usually cost-effective since recovered gas can be used for energy purposes. Stabilization 
of atmospheric methane concentrations would require a reduction of current global 
anthropogenic emissions by 5% (or about 22 TgCH4). Such a reduction would correspond 
to about a quarter of the methane released by the energy sector [22,34]. Current estimates 
indicate that the methane emission reduction potential at negative or low costs amounts to 
I 0% of anthropogenic emissions [22]. The largest reduction potentials are in waste 
management and agriculture. That is, stabilization of current atmospheric methane 
concentrations is feasible in the near term by implementing a part of the cost-effective 
options. 
In contrast, carbon dioxide scrubbing from flue gases is still prohibitive economically 
as a large-scale mitigation strategy. Carbon removal by scrubbing is technically feasible 
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and is practiced in a number of plants that recover carbon dioxide for use in the food 
industry. The feasibility of scrubbing and subsequent disposal of carbon dioxide still 
remains to be demonstrated on a large scale. There are three main scrubbing processes: 
chemical and physical absorption, cryogenic distillation and membrane separation. One 
of the problems is that the present carbon removal methods that involve (chemical 
absorption by) amine scrubbers have high capital and operating costs and result in a 
substantial reduction of power plant efficiencies in the range of 25%. Typical scrubbing 
costs are in the region of US$ I 50 per ton carbon removed and for some processes can 
exceed US$ 500 per ton carbon [38,22]. As a result, electricity generating costs could 
easily double, indicating the substantial economic cost of this mitigation option. 
In addition, the issue of storing gigantic quantities of sequestered carbon dioxide for 
potentially thousands of years remains unresolved. Permanent storage of billions of tons 
of carbon is a daunting task. Potential carbon dioxide utilization, disposal and storage 
options include enhanced oil recovery, storage in depleted natural gas fields and other 
underground reservoirs, chemical feeds tocks and other basic materials and, finally, also 
disposal in the deep ocean. Some of these options have more limited potentials such as 
the utilization of chemical feedstocks and enhanced oil recovery. All of them involve 
unresolved issues of possible long-term leakages, often unknown disposal costs and, 
perhaps most importantly, as yet unknown environmental impacts. Disposal in the deep 
ocean has one of the largest potentials since the oceans currently store more than 40,000 
billion tons of carbon compared to six billion tons of global emissions from energy use. 
Among the major outstanding uncertainties are the possible ecological effects of higher 
concentrations of carbon dioxide in the oceans and their effects on local chemistry in the 
vicinity of storage sites [38]. 
5.5 Enhancement of natural sinks 
Enha11ce111e11t of sinks is limited as a mitigation option to those greenhouse gases that are 
absorbed by natural sinks, as is the case with carbon dioxide. Large amounts of carbon 
dioxide are continuously removed from the atmosphere through natural processes such as 
photosynthesis, weathering of rocks and absorption by the oceans. However, the rising 
concentration of greenhouse gases indicates that, due to anthropogenic activities, 
emissions have exceeded the absorptive capacity of the sinks. The enhancement of sinks 
can be achieved by a variety of measures. Potential options include so-called 'geo-
engineering' options such as deep-ocean storage, weathering of rocks, or 'iron-
fertilization' of ocean plankton productivity. It is not known whether these options are 
feasible and whether they are associated with other significant environmental impacts. 
The most important options include the preservation and the enhancement of the 
terrestrial carbon sink. Vegetation is the largest terrestrial carbon sink. It absorbs carbon 
dioxide by photosynthesis. The obvious measure is to halt global deforestation and 
enhance vegetation growth. 
Estimates of carbon releases through land-use changes during the 1980s, including 
deforestation, indicate a net annual flux of carbon to the atmosphere of between 0.6 and 
2.8 GtC (with a median value of 1.6 GtC; [34]). This compares to about 6 GtC of fossil-
energy related emissions. In addition to carbon dioxide emissions, deforestation and its 
associated biomass burning release other gases with a direct or indirect greenhouse effect, 
most notably methane, nitrous oxides and carbon monoxide. 
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Illustrative scenarios indicate that, in the absence of policy measures, deforestation 
rates could significantly increase future greenhouse gas emissions (for a review see 
Alcamo et al., (31 ]). Annual carbon dioxide emissions could be in the range of 3 to 5 GtC 
during the next century leading to an eventual destruction of the majority of the world's 
forests including practical extinction in the tropical regions. In a worst-case scenario, up 
to 340 GtC might be released into the atmosphere over the next century from 
deforestation and land-use changes. In comparison, the current atmospheric carbon 
content is about 760 GtC. 
In contrast, between 100 and 150 GtC could be sequestered from the atmosphere over 
the same time period through a dedicated global afforestation program. A number of 
studies have assessed the potential of carbon sequestration through global afforestation 
programs. Estimates indicate that over a period of 50 to 100 years between 1 and 2 GtC 
could be sequestered annually. For instance, Nilsson [46] and Nilsson and Schopfhauser 
(47] estimate a sequestration potential of 1.6 GtC per year through a 'global plantation' 
program, including existing local reforestation schemes. The direct costs for such a 
program are estimated to amount to up to US$ 500 billion for a cumulative removal of 
some 120 GtC (although infrastructural, educational, land rights and other indirect costs 
might increase this figure by a factor of two to three). The resulting average sequestration 
costs would be about US$ 4 per ton of carbon removed. This figure compares extremely 
favourably with the more capital-intensive mitigation options of the energy sector. The 
only exceptions are the low to negative costs associated with energy efficiency 
improvements. However, it has to be emphasized that afforestation costs can vary 
significantly between regions. Nilsson (46] identifies cost differences of up to a factor 30 
between different regions, with costs in more thinly populated, tropical regions being on 
the lower extreme, and costs in high labour-cost, northern-latitude countries being on the 
high extreme of the afforestation cost range. There would also be significant impacts on 
world timber markets. This indicates that regionally different strategies must be found to 
balance the impacts of a global carbon sequestration program. For example, wood use 
could be encouraged as a replacement for fossil fuels and as a basic material. 
Even if such a global afforestation program became feasible politically, institutionally 
and economically, several decades would pass before the maximum sequestration rates 
through forest regrowth could be achieved. From the perspective of the protection of the 
atmosphere and the carbon cycle, therefore, slowing down and eventually halting 
deforestation appears a more immediate priority for the enhancement of sinks. 
5.6 Adaptation measures 
Adaptation options constitute a large number of specific, preventive measures to enable 
people and natural ecosystems to adapt to possible climate change. This option could be 
employed in conjunction with mitigation measures, or as a last resort in the case of 
unavoidable and significant climate change. 
Adaptation measures are discussed here mainly for the sake of completeness, as they 
are not measures to protect the atmosphere but rather measures to minimize the adverse 
effects of possible environmental changes due to human interference with the climate 
system. Other reasons to discuss adaptation measures are related to the inertia of the 
climate system including the cumulative nature of anthropogenic emissions; the long lead 
times required between the political negotiation process, policy actions and the resulting 
reductions in emissions; and the significant time lags between emission reductions, 
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stabilization of atmospheric concentrations and eventual climate stabilization. All told, 
even in the most ambitious policy scenarios some climate change appears inevitable as a 
legacy of our past, current and medium-term reliance on fossil fuels and the long 
response time of the climate system. 
In some studies, adaptation is economically more attractive than (massive) mitigation. 
People and most ecosystems have a natural capacity to adapt to changes in climate. For 
natural ecosystems , adaptation to environmental changes occurs naturally (e.g., 
coniferous trees migrate northwards under a warming climate), albeit at very slow rates. 
Therefore, perhaps more important than absolute changes in climate are the rates by 
which climate change occurs, whether it occurs gradually, allowing natural ecosystems to 
adapt, or whether changes are sudden and abrupt. The possibilities of human intervention 
to facilitate, or to speed up natural adaptation can be considered limited, apart from some 
generic measures such as the preservation of vegetation migration corridors. This is the 
principal reason why recent climate impact research identifies natural ecosystems as 
being the most vulnerable to man-induced climate changes. 
The adaptation potential of socioeconomic systems can be considered to be 
practically unlimited within the range of environmental and climate change anticipated 
over the next century. After all, human civilization exists under a much wider variation of 
climate regimes than projected by even the most drastic future climate change scenario. 
However, adaptation requires the availability of sufficient resources, know-how and time. 
Appropriate research and development has to be put in place and financed in advance to 
permit adaptation . Some adaptation measures would simply involve better information 
and management practices such as early warning systems for extreme climate events, or 
better information concerning preventive measures to counter greater climate variability. 
Others would entail potentially significant changes in practices such as different 
agricultural crops or air and sea routes. These could have disruptive impacts, for example 
on food markets. Finally, some adaptation may entail considerable costs, such as the 
protection of low lying coastal areas from sea level rise, relocation of infrastructures, or 
construction of large enclosed areas for human protection (like superdomes and shopping 
malls) . 
Summarized below are examples of different types of adaptation measures for 
agricultural production. As a first, easy step low-cost adaptation measures include: 
changes in crop varieties, such as towards more drought resistant species: changes in 
management practices of agricultural production, for example, different planting dates: 
and changes in cultivars to completely different crops. A second step would entail 
substantial adaptations, possibly requiring resources beyond an individual farmer's 
means. This includes, for instance, additional irrigation, a more intensive application of 
additional (nitrogen) fertilizer and, ultimately, entire shifts in crop production zones. 
The impacts of some of these different types of adaptation measures on world 
agriculture could be significant. Based on representative, though highly uncertain, 
regional climate change scenarios, losses in world agricultural output are estimated to 
range between 0.3 to 4.4% for an equivalent doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations 
and assuming intermediate climate sensitivity [48,49]. Assuming easy, low-cost 
adaptations would be available, the adverse impacts are reduced to between a 0.2% gain 
in agricultural production to a 3.5% loss of agricultural output. For the full range of all 
conceivable adaptation measures, the impacts range from a gain of 0.8% to a loss of 1.6% 
of agricultural GDP. Thus, the available model estimates indicate that, at the global level, 
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adverse impacts of climate change on agriculture could be entirely averted through 
adaptation. 
However, this is only true for the global aggregate. Regional differences are persistent 
and significant. Especially noteworthy are the results that suggest that impacts on 
agriculture will generally be positive in the northern hemisphere and negative in the 
developing countries independent of the level of adaptation assumed (see also Section 5.7 
below). In any case, impacts are systematically more adverse, the lower adaptation levels 
are assumed in the crop modelling exercises. Agricultural impacts in the southern 
hemisphere are much more severe because of the anticipated larger variations in 
precipitation patterns, the higher dependence of developing economies on agriculture, as 
well as the possible limitations of implementing adaptation measures due to capital and 
institutional constraints. 
Even if the direct costs of adaptation measures in agriculture might be low, they 
nevertheless require preparatory action. Appropriate research and development (e.g., in 
drought resistant crops and changed farming practices) need to be put in place and 
financed sufficiently in advance. 
In contrast, the adaptation measures involving the (re)construction of infrastructures, 
such as for coastal zone protection or relocation of traffic routes, are extremely capital 
intensive and provide an additional argument in favour of precautionary mitigation 
measures. Again, significant differences in the capability to adapt exist between the 
developed and the developing countries. Ceteris paribus, monetary impacts can be 
expected to be greater in the industrialized countries because of the much larger capital 
stock affected. Conversely , adaptation capabilities in terms of technological and 
institutional know-how and especially capital availability are much greater in the 
industrialized countries. 
This points to the need to consider carefully the differences in impacts, and the 
mitigation and adaptation potentials, among different world regions and countries as 
discussed in the next section. It has to be emphasized, however, that significant scientific 
uncertainties exist with respect to regional climate change impacts and these are unlikely 
to become resolved in the near-term future. Thus policy-makers have to face these 
uncertainties especially at the sub-regional and national level. 
5. 7 Special circumstances in different world regions 
There are large disparities in the capacity to mitigate and adapt to environmental changes 
from energy production and use among different regions and countries. Recognizing the 
common, but differentiated responsibilities, as well as the different social and economic 
priorities and capabilities to respond to the challenge of global environmental change, the 
FCCC differentiates among three groups of countries: the industrialized countries of the 
OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Annex II 
countries); the Industrialized countries undergoing a process of economic reform and 
'transition to a market economy' (FCCC Annex I countries in addition to Annex II); and 
finally the remaining (mostly) developing countries. Despite significant differences 
among individual countries, the following section attempts to summarize some specifics 
for each of these three regional groupings in terms of impacts of global environmental 
change and challenges for sustainable energy development. 
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5. 7.1 The OCED countries 
Most of the countries in the OECD region are characterized by mature and highly 
developed economies with high levels of income, energy consumption and energy-related 
greenhouse gas emissions. As a region they share the highest responsibility for historical 
and current energy use and greenhouse gas emissions (cf. Section 3.7). They also have 
the highest near to medium-term emissions reduction potentials, the highest financial and 
technological mitigation and adaptation capabilities, and generally also the lowest 
vulnerability to environmental impacts both as a result of their high-income levels and 
high capabilities for adaptation. 
5.7.2 ·Countries in transition to a market economy 
The countries in the transition process to a market economy consist primarily of the 
formally centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. Although highly industrialized, the transition economies are characterized 
by a number of unique features. 
The transition process is disruptive and is taking longer than initially anticipated. 
Between 1990 and 1994, the combined economic output of the economies in transition 
fell by some 40% [ 15], an unparalleled drop in peacetime. It is larger than that during the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. As a consequence, primary energy demand fell by some 
25 % over the same time period and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by some 
30% [21 ]. Recent scenarios indicate that it may take two to three decades before energy 
use and emission levels return to their pre-restructuring levels [ 12,35]. 
This means that these countries are probably well below any current or near-term 
commitments for stabilization of emissions as formulated within the FCCC. Additionally, 
other urgent social and economic priorities, as well as severe capital constraints, have led 
to low policy priority for any specific and additional mitigation or adaptation measures. A 
chronic shortage of capital is compounded by significant financing requirements for the 
replacement of obsolete energy infrastructures and equipment, estimated to amount up to 
10% of the current economic output in the region (50]. At the same time, the process of 
economic restructuring opens further opportunities for efficiency improvements and 
structural changes in the energy sector that could reconcile the pressing near-term needs 
to overcome the effects of the economic depression with the more longer-term objectives 
of sustainable energy development. 
The current (uncertain) estimates of possible impacts of climate change in these 
regions indicate that they would not all be adverse. For instance, impacts on agriculture 
would generally be favourable due to the extended growing seasons and higher 
precipitation [22]. However, significant adverse impacts of climate change are anticipated 
for most natural ecosystems not managed by man, in particular for boreal forests. Boreal 
forests are vulnerable because they are more affected by temperature changes than forests 
in other latitudinal zones and because warming is expected to be high at high latitudes. It 
is possible that northern tree lines might migrate into regions currently occupied by 
tundra [22]. 
Another, scientifically more speculative, impact could be methane releases from 
permafrost areas, mainly in tundra soils and in the form of methane clathrates . Current 
estimates of methane releases from melting ground ice in Siberia put emissions between 
two and ten TgCH.i per year, corresponding to 0.5 to 3% of current anthropogenic 
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emissions [22]. Increasing methane release rates could have a significant additional 
warming impact because of the large quantities of methane captured in permafrost areas 
and methane's high radiative forcing. At present, however, information on the depth 
distribution of methane clathrates is too sparse to enable an assessment of potential 
methane release rates under a warmer climate. 
5. 7.3 Developing countries 
Developing countries face a triple challenge. First, their historical and current 
contribution to energy-related global environmental stresses is low (Section 3. 7) but is 
expected to increase in the future with the required social and economic development. 
This, however, will take several decades. According to the IPCC IS92 scenarios [36], the 
share of developing countries in energy-related carbon dioxide emissions would surpass 
the 50% mark between the years 2035 to 2045 and reach shares between 64% and 71 % of 
global emissions by the end of the 21st century . The recent IIASA-WEC scenarios 
[ 12,35] explore a wider and more representative range of possible scenarios for 
developing countries. In the absence of drastic policy measures, the developing countries' 
share in global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions would surpass 50% by between 
2025 and 2030 and reach between 59% and 84% by the end of the 21st century. Thus, 
more than five decades would pass before the developing countries would have a similar 
share in atmospheric concentration increases as the industrialized countries have today; 
the difference is that they would have more than 80% of the global population by that 
time. Thus, historical and current inequalities with respect to emissions and contributions 
to atmospheric concentration increases will continue to persist for many decades to come. 
The second dilemma deals with the much higher vulnerability of developing countries 
to possible climate changes. Although absolute monetary estimates of damages are 
affected by a wide range of uncertainty, there is a broad agreement among different 
studies that damage from climate change accounts for a significantly higher proportion of 
economic activities in developing countries than in industrialized ones [22]. Even though 
climate change is generally projected to be much lower in southern than in northern 
latitudes, these countries have a greater reliance on climate sensitive activities such as 
agriculture. Currently, agriculture accounts for about 21 % of total economic output in 
developing countries compared to only 4 % in industrialized countries (OECD and 
transition economy countries). Larger climate change impacts are also expected in 
developing countries due to multiple environmental and other stresses including poverty, 
population growth, pollution, desertification, industrial and infrastructural development, 
etc . 
The third dilemma is that the adaptation possibilities of developing countries are also 
more limited because of low national incomes that result in low research and 
development budgets, severe capital scarcities and limited institutional capacities to deal 
with climate change. 
As an illustration, one important category of climate change impacts, namely 
agricultural production and food availability, is briefly summarized here. It is a 
recognized objective of the FCCC to assure that food production is not threatened. 
Impacts on agriculture are twofold. First, are changes in crop yields due to changes in 
climate variables like temperature and precipitation and possible carbon dioxide 
fertilization effects. Second, changes in crop production patterns would result in changes 
in agricultural prices , which would affect food exporters and importers differently . For 
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instance, food-importing countries could suffer economic losses due to higher world 
prices even in scenarios where domestic food production would increase under a 
changing climate. The scale of impacts is, of course, not only related to the biophysical 
vulnerability of national agricultural systems, but also to the lack of excess production 
capacities in most developing countries today. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the range of economic impacts on agriculture for an equivalent 
doubling of carbon dioxide concentration. The range (negative values denote losses, 
positive denote gains) reflects the uncertainty of regional climate changes as projected by 
three different climate scenarios. Three different levels of impacts are differentiated. 
Impacts assuming no carbon dioxide fertilization effects and no adaptation measures, 
with fertilization and without adaptations, and finally with fertilization and adaptation 
combined. Obviously, combining fertilization effects and adaptation, damage is reduced 
significantly at the global as well as the regional level. However, the most significant 
result is that the estimated damage is systematically greater in developing countries 
across all scenarios. Damage is highest in the poorest countries of income levels below 
US$ 500 per capita. Even in the most optimistic scenario of Table 5.1, losses in 
agriculture in the poorest developing countries are more than twice as large as in the 
OECD countries. 
Table 5.1 Estimated economic effects of climate change on agriculture in billion US$ 
Del'elopi11g co1111tries No CoJertiliz C0 2 fertiliz. COJerti/iz. 
by income level No adaptation No adaptation + adaptation 
< $500/capita -57--121 -2--20 -0--15 
$500-2000/capita -26--48 -2--15 -0--1 I 
>$2000/capita -7--4 -I - -0 -0--1 
REFs" -13--57 +2--1 I +2--5 
OECDh 
-13--18 +3--15 +6--7 
World -I 16- -248 ±0- -61 +7 --39 
Source: IPCC SAR WG JI, [22] 
,FCCC Annex I countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy 
°FCCC Annex II countries 
This illustrates the 'trilemma' of developing countries. These countries bear the lowest 
responsibility for human interference with the atmosphere but are the most vulnerable to 
climate changes and they have the lowest capabilities and available resources for 
adaptation. Consequently, impacts and damages of climate change tend to be largest in 
the developing world, particularly in the lowest income countries. 
6 Policy instruments to control anthropogenic impacts 
The previous section gave an overview of numerous mitigation and adaptation options for 
the protection of the atmosphere. Usually these options are discussed from the 
perspective of possible technological barriers and attractors for their implementation, 
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including availability, performance, costs and environmental compatibility. This section 
on policy instruments focuses on non-technical barriers and impediments, as well as on 
the non-technical attractors and incentives that have to be dealt with as a prerequisite for 
the implementation of mitigation and adaptation options. The policy instruments include, 
among others, market, regulatory and institutional measures. 
6.1 Policies for sustainable energy development 
A generic policy instrument to be mentioned first are measures that raise both public and 
private awareness, as well as helping to reduce the significant scientific and policy 
uncertainties involved, especially when dealing with long-term sustainable development 
criteria and environmental issues. Research, both domestic and through international 
cooperation, can help to improve knowledge but even improved knowledge does not lead 
automatically to better policy decisions if the information is confined within a small 
scientific or technocratic elite. Therefore, public awareness is critical, to promote a 
favourable social context and acceptance for the implementation of the numerous 
measures necessary to move societies on environmentally sustainable development 
pathways. 
No single mitigation option is likely to become the unique and universally adopted 
solution if drastic reductions of emissions from industrial, energy and consumption 
activities are required. All options must be evaluated in their different regional, national 
or sectoral contexts and on the basis of full life-cycle analyses. The combination of 
several mitigation options along improved and new technology chains, plus associated 
synergies, will be needed to achieve substantial emission reductions. These combinations 
may be region or sector specific but could also involve generic new technology chains 
and synergisms such as a stronger reliance on carbon-free energy carriers in the energy 
sector. 
Considerable additional benefits are attached to those options that tackle greenhouse 
gas emissions and also mitigate other adverse local and regional environmental problems. 
This point is stressed not merely because of its technical and financial cost-benefit 
implications but also because it clearly implies a holistic approach to environmental 
problems that encompasses local and regional as well as potential global concerns. This 
holistic approach towards simultaneous consideration of social and economic 
development needs including a comprehensive environmental perspective from the local 
to the global scale is at the heart of sustainable development. 
Likewise, no single policy measure or instrument will be sufficient for the timely 
development, adoption and diffusion of mitigation options. Pervasive and simultaneous 
multinational adoption would reduce their differential consequences. Special 
consideration must be given to policies that foster the adoption of mitigation technologies 
which enhance economic development without undermining global environmental 
sustainability. Policy instruments that enable increasing supplies of high quality energy 
services, growth of per capita income and living standards should receive the highest 
priority in developing countries. In the industrialized countries with high per capita 
energy consumption levels and incomes, policies are called upon that reduce emissions 
without causing a loss of useful energy services. 
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6.2 Policies for energy efficiency and decarbonization 
To achieve these seemingly conflicting objectives of providing better, cleaner, higher 
quality and more energy services (especially in the developing countries) while avoiding 
harmful environmental side effects, high priority must be given to efficiency 
improvements. Such improvements, even using existing plant and equipment, are 
substantial and can be achieved relatively quickly. The adoption of the currently best 
available technologies and practices can achieve even more. Section 5 discussed the 
potential for energy efficiency improvement of some 50% through the implementation of 
currently available, best performing technologies worldwide. Considering further 
technological development, the efficiency improvement potential in the long term would 
be even more substantial [22,42]. 
Efficiency improvements are particularly attractive as a target for policy instruments. 
They generate multiple benefits: lower resource consumption, reduced environmental 
impacts and lower system costs . Productivity growth of all factor inputs, including 
energy, is therefore a prerequisite for sustainable economic development. Another class 
of options that promise the generation of multiple benefits is the decarbonization of the 
energy system. Decarbonization involves shifts to low-carbon and carbon-free energy 
sources and carriers: the lower the carbon content of fuels, the lower the environmental 
impacts are on local air quality, as well as carbon dioxide emissions. 
An energy system centred on the energy carriers electricity and hydrogen is virtually 
emission free at the point of energy end use and can be made emission free also at the 
point of energy production and conversion. Increased reliance on natural gas (where 
available), pre or post-conversion carbon removal from fossil sources and carbon-free 
sources such as renewables and nuclear energy would individually and collectively 
contribute to the decarbonization of the energy system. The possible implementp.tion 
instruments for energy efficiency improvements and decarbonization fall into at least four 
categories: global and international, regional and national, sector specific and technology 
(chain) specific. 
6.3 Market and 11011-market policy instruments 
The following generic policy instruments are applicable to the four categories specified 
above. The broadest division is in market and non-market instruments . Market 
instruments include taxes, fees, tax exemptions, subsidies (including accelerated 
depreciation provisions), tradeable permits, 'polluter pays' principles and the 
internalization of environmental externalities. Non-market instruments include 
information, advertizements, education, standards and legal and institutional regulations, 
bans and controls. Most of these market and non-market instruments may work in both 
directions, removing or establishing barriers, or promoting or hampering progress. 
In the short run, the most promising area for the application of market and non-
market instruments are the energy end-use sectors. The same also applies for the control 
of chlorofluorocarbons. To a large extent, energy end-use conversion accounts for the 
highest inefficiencies within the energy system (see Section 5). Because of the huge 
number of economic agents involved and the difficulty in developing equitable economic 
incentives, non-market instruments, such as building codes, vehicle standards, or stack 
emission regulations, have been successfully employed by many countries. Since the 
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efficiency improvements in the end-use sector are the key for meeting the sustainable 
development objective, policy instruments need increasingly to focus on this sector. 
Recently, a hybrid of policy instruments encompassing non-market and market 
elements has gained momentum. Integrated resource planning (IRP) and demand side 
management (DSM) are instruments imposed on utilities by regulatory institutions with 
the objective of shifting the focus of utility businesses from selling, for example, just 
kWhs to selling energy services. Here, utilities have begun to provide economic 
incentives to their customers for load shifting and replacing inefficient end-use devices. 
Furthermore, selling energy services instead of energy carriers puts utilities in a better 
position to market their previously worthless by-products such as waste heat. 
Consequently, DSM and IRP enhance the prospect for the development of combined heat 
and power (CHP) and district heat energy systems, furthering substantial efficiency gains. 
Greenhouse gas emissions and the possibility of climate change are global 
phenomena, therefore it is self-evident that international policy implementation is 
required, quite apart from the competitiveness issue already mentioned. The Framework 
Convention on Climate Change provides provisions for such measures, e.g., joint 
implementation schemes. The specific details for implementing these schemes still 
require careful negotiations, especially the provisions for possible crediting of emission 
reductions. 
The assessment above has indicated that many technological options are available 
that could promote social and economic development, efficiency improvements and a 
reduction of environmental impacts. Thus, there is no scarcity in human ingenuity that 
can be exploited to move onto the path of sustainable development. The main questions 
concern the policy instruments required to promote, for example, technology capacity 
building and transfer, efficiency improvements and decarbonization at unprecedented 
levels. It has to be emphasized that in many instances new policy initiatives can build on 
existing trends towards more efficient stewardship of resources. There, the task ahead for 
policy may be less daunting if indeed only a significant acceleration of desirable 
structural changes in our economies and energy systems is required, as opposed to radical 
departures from longer-term tendencies. 
New institutional arrangements, including both market and non-market instruments 
need to be introduced at the global level. Instruments for the promotion of sustainable 
development and for a major reduction of adverse environmental impacts would have to 
reach beyond voluntary compliance or reliance upon market forces alone. The deal here 
is not so much one of market failure, i.e., wrong or misleading market signals, but with a 
situation of market exclusion. In numerous cases, important issues such as externalities 
have been excluded from any consideration in the market place. Again, it is unlikely that 
these instruments would be justified or implemented solely to respond to individual 
environmental challenges, e.g., for the purpose of countering the danger of climate 
change. Clearly, policy instruments need first of all to be linked to local and regional 
development priorities such as the improvement of energy services, as well as the 
improvement of local air quality and other adverse impacts of energy supply and use. 
Some of these instruments require monitoring the progress of policy implementation and 
measures to ensure compliance. For example, the creation of new cartels that impede 
access to environmentally benign technologies must be avoided. 
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6.4 Regional and national policy instruments 
Policy instruments also need to account for regional differences in the levels of human 
development and the resulting social and development imperatives, levels of resource 
endowments, and economic and technological vintage structures. For example, 
implementation instruments in regions with large hydro, wind, biomass or natural gas 
resources would be different from those in regions with small energy resource 
endowments. Another example is the development of generic technologies; for example, 
if deep-ocean carbon dioxide disposal turns out to be environmentally acceptable, it is 
primarily of interest to some coastal regions. Likewise, the option of carbon dioxide 
reinjection into depleted gas fields is only feasible in gas-producing regions. Another 
promising option is a strong reliance on biomass. However, adequate land availability can 
become a limiting factor. For most renewable sources of energy, including modern 
biomass, development can also have adverse local environmental impacts which may 
create other limitations. For example, a stronger reliance on biomass might require the 
development of 400 to 600 million hectares of sustainable and socially acceptable energy 
crop plantations [ 12], harmonized with other agricultural activities such as food 
production for a global population of, say, ten billion people. 
Until the 1980s, regulation was the dominant environmental policy instrument at the 
national and regional levels. Recently, economic and market-oriented approaches have 
gained momentum compared with non-market instruments. The application of market 
instruments at the macroeconomic level is intended to establish undistorted pricing 
mechanisms and competitiveness. In the energy sector alone, removal of distortionary 
fuel price subsidies is estimated to lead to substantial efficiency gains of up to 18% of 
emissions [6]. Many of these measures may also be needed to establish an equal-level 
playing field. In economies with emerging new sectors, macroeconomic measures have 
been applied to provide temporary protection. 
6.5 Policy instruments for adequate financing 
Neither the establishment of level playing fields nor temporary protection can overcome 
one major economic barrier, especially in the developing countries: namely, the chronic 
lack of capital. Even if a project has lower life-cycle costs and emissions but higher 
upfront capital requirements compared with its alternatives, it simply may not attract the 
necessary financing. In addition, energy and environmental measures compete for limited 
capital with many other development needs. Developing countries face many urgent 
problems such as the eradication of poverty, famine, malnutrition, substandard housing, 
locally contaminated water and air, etc. All compete for scarce resources . However, to 
meet the rising demand for energy and to assure minimum environmental protection at 
the local and regional level, capital requirements are expected to increase dramatically in 
the future. For instance, energy sector financing requirements in the developing countries 
over the next three decades are estimated to range between US(l 990)$ 3,000 and 9,000 
billion, depending on the growth in energy demand, the structure of energy supply and, 
most notably, capital availability [51,50). For comparison, the estimated costs of 
implementing the Agenda 21 Program are estimated to amount to US$ 20 billion for the 
period 1993-2000 [ 1] to be supplied by grant or concessional terms. 
Even in the industrialized countries, where financing for capital-intensive projects is 
easier to obtain, there are major barriers to efficiency improvements and energy sector 
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restructuring and decarbonization at the national level. Often, higher returns can be 
obtained in areas other than the energy sector. The promotion of flexible, small scale but 
mass-produced supply and conversion plants and equipment would help resolve some of 
the financing difficulties by reducing the risk, uncertainty and upfront capital 
requirements . 
6.6 Policy instruments for enhancing knowledge and skills 
A special problem is the variation of general technology-related knowledge, experience 
and skills among regions and countries. For example, the developing countries' 
endowment of know-how and know-why required to induce the development, import and 
adoption of new technologies often lags behind that of developed countries. There is a 
need for reliable , impartial information on available technologies, including detailed 
descriptions. Much of the information about mitigation options and implementation 
instruments is tailored to the needs and situations in the developed countries and hence of 
limited use in the developing countries. Informational needs are, however, only the first 
step . Evaluations and technology assessments of how different options fit into diverse 
local situations and development needs are important requirements. Hence, local capacity 
building is essential. Additional non-market barriers include institutional and legal 
frameworks, procedural requirements, language barriers and the provision of spare parts 
and maintenance. 
Technology appropriateness is also an important issue in this context and must be 
specifically addressed by both donors and recipients and through joint development. It 
will be necessary to account for distinct differences in the innovation needs between the 
industrialized and developing countries. Highly efficient, capital intensive technology 
options involving minimal labour may be the preferred solution in the industrialized 
world . For developing countries , the priorities may well be for labour-intensive, low 
capital and medium efficiency technology to pave the way toward sustainable economic 
development. 
Therefore , complex and capital intensive technologies should first be implemented in 
the industrialized countries that have both higher research and development and financial 
resources to cope with the inevitable risks involved in the innovation process. The 
industrialized countries also need to provide for initial niche markets for new 
environmentally benign technologies in order that learning curve effects and associated 
cost reductions are exploited to a maximum before technologies can diffuse to the 
developing countries . Existing international financial instruments for economic 
development are seriously out of tune with the innovation needs in the developing 
countries. Here, policy should encourage and support indigenous innovation impulses and 
enhanced local capabilities for assessment and adaptation of technologies to best fit to the 
specific local and national development and environmental priorities. 
Provisions of safety and health measures in the workplace have been integrated into 
the legal and institutional frameworks of modern societies . In short, they are part of the 
social contract. The implementation of mitigation options at the regional and national 
levels also requires their inclusion in the social contract. A collective implementation of 
mitigation policy instruments is required; this is not a question of single technology 
options. This is a socio-cultural process as well as one of technology and economy. 
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6. 7 Sector and technology specific policy instruments 
Policy instruments affecting the entire energy system include em1ss1on and energy 
taxation or regulatory provisions and standards. With the exception of fossil-fuelled 
electricity generation, the energy supply sector accounts for a smaller share of total 
energy-related greenhouse gas emissions than the energy end-use sectors. Therefore, 
carbon taxes levied at the point of emissions would be collected primarily at the level of 
end-use and thus only indirectly affect the non-electric energy supply sector. A final 
important generic aspect of regulatory measures is that they must restrict themselves to 
establishing more comprehensive costing principles by internalizing externalities and 
focus on performance and environmental standards rather than prescribing particular 
technologies. 
Most innovations spread from centres where the initial adoption occurs. Establishing 
special ecozones might help catalyze and accelerate sustainable development and the 
promotion of environmentally friendly technologies. Policy should support the creation 
of fertile socio-economic conditions. Likewise , broad market instruments are required to 
create a conducive environment for accelerated innovation and research and 
development. 
The fourth category of implementation instruments is technology-specific and thus 
very heterogeneous. It involves the promotion and development of individual 
technologies and their combinations into entire technology chains. The most important 
instruments in this category involve the removal of non-technical barriers to the 
innovation and adoption of new technologies and the creation of new attractors for 
development and diffusion. 
In addition to promoting the research and development of the physical aspects of 
technology, policy instruments should also include paper and software-embodied 
technology. Manuals, operating procedures and programs are all an integral part of 
enhancing local skills and know-how. Skills and know-how in turn have to be acquired 
through formal education, training programs and 'learning by doing'. The human 
embodiment of technological knowledge is perhaps the most important aspect of this 
fourth category. Not only does it determine the internal capabilities for appropriating 
economic and social gains from technologies, but it also determines the capacity for 
further innovation and the adaptation of new technologies and practices [52] . Capacity 
building and the development of human resources should be a high priority in any 
technology development and transfer program, especially at the technology-specific 
level. 
Another critical aspect is the transfer of technology and know-how from the 
laboratory and development stage to commercialization and subsequent diffusion. Policy 
instruments include tax exemptions, subsidies with sunset clauses, rewards for technical 
excellence, end-user subsidies, promotion of integrated resource planning and, where 
necessary, temporary protective measures. More importantly, the policy instruments 
should remove barriers to innovation such as protective subsidies for mature technologies 
and other market imperfections. Research and development policy should make available 
sufficiently earmarked and stable funding for the development of technologies with long 
lead times. This condition is of particular importance when the development of a whole 
set of new technologies is involved. Obviously, related efforts must be greatest where 
resources are largest, i.e. , in the industrialized countries. 
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In the case of a transition to completely new production and energy systems and 
technologies, sometimes called technological leap-frogging, it is important to take 
account of additional social costs for new infrastructures and supporting systems. For 
example, a potential barrier might be the need to maintain both the old and the new 
systems during the transition period leading to additional social costs and perhaps also 
unsatisfactory services. Considering such and other possible barriers, it is important for 
the government or some appropriate public body to promote the new systems and remove 
the hidden barriers until they reach commercialization. 
Once a new technology reaches commercialization, a new set of instruments is 
required to promote flexibility and cost reductions along the learning curve. In the case of 
modular and flexible technologies, e.g., wind turbines, gas turbines and fuel cells, cost 
reductions through 'learning by doing' and 'learning by using' can indeed by significant. 
In other cases, such as the production of large amounts of biomass, the learning curve 
effects could be more limited, especially in arid areas with little experience of high 
intensity agriculture. 
New problems, however, may emerge with increasing scales of production. Examples 
in energy supply are particularly numerous as far as adverse environmental impacts are 
concerned. Each generation of technology has a tendency to solve old problems and yet 
create new ones [53]. Exceptional care and anticipatory measures will have to be taken if 
the policy instruments introduced for improving the human condition and for protecting 
the environment are to avoid the creation of new unanticipated problems and concerns. 
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